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Résumé
Cette thèse se compose de trois articles sur les politiques budgétaires et monétaires optimales.
Dans le premier article, J’étudie la détermination conjointe de la politique budgétaire et monétaire
optimale dans un cadre néo-keynésien avec les marchés du travail frictionnels, de la monnaie et
avec distortion des taux d’imposition du revenu du travail. Dans le premier article, je trouve que
lorsque le pouvoir de négociation des travailleurs est faible, la politique Ramsey-optimale appelle
à un taux optimal d’inflation annuel significativement plus élevé, au-delà de 9.5%, qui est aussi
très volatile, au-delà de 7.4%. Le gouvernement Ramsey utilise l’inflation pour induire des fluc-
tuations efficaces dans les marchés du travail, malgré le fait que l’évolution des prix est coûteuse
et malgré la présence de la fiscalité du travail variant dans le temps. Les résultats quantitatifs
montrent clairement que le planificateur s’appuie plus fortement sur l’inflation, pas sur l’impôts,
pour lisser les distorsions dans l’économie au cours du cycle économique. En effet, il ya un com-
promis tout à fait clair entre le taux optimal de l’inflation et sa volatilité et le taux d’impôt sur le
revenu optimal et sa variabilité. Le plus faible est le degré de rigidité des prix, le plus élevé sont le
taux d’inflation optimal et la volatilité de l’inflation et le plus faible sont le taux d’impôt optimal
sur le revenu et la volatilité de l’impôt sur le revenu. Pour dix fois plus petit degré de rigidité
des prix, le taux d’inflation optimal et sa volatilité augmentent remarquablement, plus de 58% et
10%, respectivement, et le taux d’impôt optimal sur le revenu et sa volatilité déclinent de façon
spectaculaire. Ces résultats sont d’une grande importance étant donné que dans les modèles fric-
tionnels du marché du travail sans politique budgétaire et monnaie, ou dans les Nouveaux cadres
keynésien même avec un riche éventail de rigidités réelles et nominales et un minuscule degré de
rigidité des prix, la stabilité des prix semble être l’objectif central de la politique monétaire opti-
male. En l’absence de politique budgétaire et la demande de monnaie, le taux d’inflation optimal
tombe très proche de zéro, avec une volatilité environ 97 pour cent moins, compatible avec la
littérature. Dans le deuxième article, je montre comment les résultats quantitatifs impliquent que
le pouvoir de négociation des travailleurs et les coûts de l’aide sociale de règles monétaires sont
liées négativement. Autrement dit, le plus faible est le pouvoir de négociation des travailleurs, le
plus grand sont les coûts sociaux des règles de politique monétaire. Toutefois, dans un contraste
saisissant par rapport à la littérature, les règles qui régissent à la production et à l’étroitesse du
marché du travail entraînent des coûts de bien-être considérablement plus faible que la règle de
ciblage de l’inflation. C’est en particulier le cas pour la règle qui répond à l’étroitesse du marché
du travail. Les coûts de l’aide sociale aussi baisse remarquablement en augmentant la taille du
coefficient de production dans les règles monétaires. Mes résultats indiquent qu’en augmentant
le pouvoir de négociation du travailleur au niveau Hosios ou plus, les coûts de l’aide sociale des
trois règles monétaires diminuent significativement et la réponse à la production ou à la étroitesse
du marché du travail n’entraîne plus une baisse des coûts de bien-être moindre que la règle de
ciblage de l’inflation, qui est en ligne avec la littérature existante. Dans le troisième article, je
montre d’abord que la règle Friedman dans un modèle monétaire avec une contrainte de type
cash-in-advance pour les entreprises n’est pas optimale lorsque le gouvernement pour financer ses
dépenses a accès à des taxes à distorsion sur la consommation. Je soutiens donc que, la règle
Friedman en présence de ces taxes à distorsion est optimale si nous supposons un modèle avec
travaie raw-efficace où seule le travaie raw est soumis à la contrainte de type cash-in-advance
et la fonction d’utilité est homothétique dans deux types de main-d’oeuvre et séparable dans la
consommation. Lorsque la fonction de production présente des rendements constants à l’échelle,
contrairement au modèle des produits de trésorerie de crédit que les prix de ces deux produits sont
les mêmes, la règle Friedman est optimal même lorsque les taux de salaire sont différents. Si la
fonction de production des rendements d’échelle croissant ou decroissant, pour avoir l’optimalité
de la règle Friedman, les taux de salaire doivent être égales.
Mots clés: Frictions de marché du travail; La rigidité des prix; La stabilité des prix;
Taux d’inflation optimal et sa volatilité; Les coûts de l’aide sociale de règles monétaires; La
règle de Friedman
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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays on optimal fiscal and monetary policies. In the first two
essays, I consider New Keynesian frameworks with frictional labor markets, money and distor-
tionary income tax rates. In the first one, I study the joint determination of optimal fiscal and
monetary policy and the role of worker’s bargaining power on this determination. In the second
one, I study the effects of worker’s bargaining power on the welfare costs of three monetary policy
rules, which are: strict inflation targeting and simple monetary rules that respond to output and
labor market tightness, with and without interest-rate smoothing. In the third essay, I study the
optimality of the Friedman rule in monetary economies where demand for money is motivated by
firms, originated in a cash-in-advance constraint.
In the first essay, I find that when the worker’s bargaining power is low, the Ramsey-optimal
policy calls for a significantly high optimal annual rate of inflation, in excess of 9.5%, that is also
highly volatile, in excess of 7.4%. The Ramsey government uses inflation to induce efficient fluc-
tuations in labor markets, despite the fact that changing prices is costly and despite the presence of
time-varying labor taxes. The quantitative results clearly show that the planner relies more heavily
on inflation, not taxes, in smoothing distortions in the economy over the business cycle. Indeed,
there is a quite clear trade-off between the optimal inflation rate and its volatility and the optimal
income tax rate and its variability. The smaller is the degree of price stickiness, the higher are the
optimal inflation rate and inflation volatility and the lower are the optimal income tax rate and in-
come tax volatility. For a ten times smaller degree of price stickiness, the optimal rate of inflation
and its volatility rise remarkably, over 58% and 10%, respectively, and the optimal income tax
rate and its volatility decline dramatically. These results are significant given that in the frictional
labor market models without fiscal policy and money, or in the Walrasian-based New Keynesian
frameworks with even a rich array of real and nominal rigidities and for even a miniscule degree of
price stickiness, price stability appears to be the central goal of optimal monetary policy. Absent
fiscal policy and money demand frictions, optimal rate of inflation falls to very near zero, with a
volatility about 97 percent lesser, consistent with the literature.
In the second essay, I show how the quantitative results imply that worker’s bargaining weight
and welfare costs of monetary rules are related negatively. That is, the lower the bargaining
power of workers, the larger the welfare losses of monetary rules. However, in a sharp contrast
to the literature, the rules that respond to output and labor market tightness feature considerably
lower welfare costs than the strict inflation targeting rule. This is specifically the case for the rule
that responds to labor market tightness. The welfare costs also remarkably decline by increasing
the size of the output coefficient in the monetary rules. My findings indicate that by raising the
worker’s bargaining power to the Hosios level and higher, welfare losses of the three monetary
rules drop significantly and response to output or market tightness does not, anymore, imply lower
iv
welfare costs than the strict inflation targeting rule, which is in line with the existing literature.
In the third essay, I first show that the Friedman rule in a monetary model with a cash-in-
advance constraint for firms is not optimal when the government to finance its expenditures has
access to distortionary taxes on consumption. I then argue that, the Friedman rule in the presence
of these distorting taxes is optimal if we assume a model with raw-efficient labors where only
the raw labor is subject to the cash-in-advance constraint and the utility function is homothetic in
two types of labor and separable in consumption. Once the production function exhibits constant-
returns-to-scale, unlike the cash-credit goods model that the prices of both goods are the same, the
Friedman is optimal even when wage rates are different. If the production function has decreasing
or increasing-returns-to-scale, then to have the optimality of the Friedman rule, wage rates should
be equal.
Keywords: Labor Market Frictions; Price Rigidity; Price Stability; Optimal Inflation Rate and
Volatility; Welfare Costs of Monetary Rules; The Friedman Rule
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Introduction
Monetary and fiscal policies are central tools of macroeconomic management. Over the past
two decades, there has been a very large literature on optimal fiscal and monetary policies in
the context of New Keynesian models, which have become the workhorse for the analysis of the
business cycles, monetary policy, fiscal policy, and inflation. The common finding of all these
studies implies an optimal inflation volatility that is zero or close to zero, due to the presence
of price adjustment costs, when the fiscal authorities raise revenue either by lump sum taxes or
by distorting taxes. In this literature, even for a miniscule degree of price stickiness that is for
example ten times below available empirical estimates, the optimal volatility of inflation remains
still near zero. What is, however, absent in most of these models is the existence of involuntary
unemployment which is, perhaps, the most unpleasant feature of modern advanced economies.
This has been particularly the case since the onset of the Great Recession in 2008. To be sure,
recently, there has been an outburst of papers studying optimal monetary policy in the context of
DSGE frameworks with frictional labor markets and sticky prices. But a central characteristic of
all those papers is that optimal policy is derived in environments where fiscal policy is ignored and
the government is assumed to have a fiscal budget constraint that is balanced at all times due to the
presence of lump-sum taxation. However, assuming such an assumption not only is empirically
unrealistic but also undermines a potentially significant role of monetary policy in stabilization of
costly aggregate fluctuations around a distorted steady-state equilibrium. And also as the recent
global financial crisis and its aftermath rocked the advanced economies, the tenability of ignoring
fiscal policy has been strained.
Therefore, in the first two essays, I extend the Canonical New Keynesian model and allow
for search and matching frictions, money, and distortionary labor income taxes and then study
Ramsey-optimal policy and simple monetary policy rules. The general equilibrium search and
matching model incorporates a labor force participation decision and uses the “instantaneous hir-
ing” view of transitions between search unemployment and employment, such that newly hired
workers start to work right away without any delay. Several studies have recently confirmed that
this type of timing is consistent with the U.S. labor market flows at a quarterly frequency. It also
has recently become common in models with frictional labor markets (see, e.g., Blanchard and
Gali (2010) and Arseneau and Chugh (2012) among many others). My motivation behind consid-
ering distorting labor income taxes comes from the fact that several researchers find that adding
tax-style wedges to the business cycle models enable them to fit the U.S. business cycle data well.
For example, Chari et al. (2007) find that the efficiency and labor wedges together account for
essentially all of the fluctuations in the U.S. data. Ohanian (2010) also shows that, even during the
recent great recession, the role of the labor wedge was greater than normal. Price adjustment costs
are introduced a la Rotemberg (1982), by assuming that firms face a convex cost of price adjust-
ment. Money friction demands are introduced into the model via cash-in-advance constraints in
such a way that holding liquidity balances facilitates the household’s ability to purchase consump-
tion goods and the firm’s ability to pay for the wage bill. Motivating a working capital constraint
for firms comes from the facts that more than 60 percent of M1 in industrialized economies is
held by firms. The models’ fluctuations are conditional on exogenous government expenditure
and productivity processes, each of which is calibrated to US data. The key mechanism underly-
ing the main results in the first two essays stems from the interaction between the existence of a
fiscal policy, in fact the absence of lump-sum taxation, and low bargaining power on the part of
workers.
To ascertain the roles of labor market frictions and of fiscal policy in inducing optimal Ramsey
dynamics, in the first essay, I simulate four different economies: the baseline model with money
and with search and matching frictions and labor income taxes (baseline monetary model); the
baseline monetary model without money and fiscal policy; the baseline monetary model without
labor market frictions (New-Keynesian monetary model), and the Canonical New-Keynesian model.
The main result is that in the baseline monetary model and once the worker’s bargaining power
is low, the Ramsey-optimal inflation rate is very high and very volatile over the business cycle,
orders of magnitude more volatile and higher than the optimal inflation rate in the other three
models. The labor market dynamics induced by optimal policy in the baseline model are vastly
different from their counterparts in the no fiscal-policy model. More specifically, for the baseline
calibration, the optimal policy features an inflation rate that is 9.6 percent per year with a volat-
ility of 7.4 percent. On the fiscal part, optimal fiscal policy is characterized by a highly volatile
income tax rate, 30%, with a volatility of 5.5%. Once I reduce the degree of price stickiness, I
find a clear trade off between the optimal rate of inflation and its volatility and the optimal rate of
labor income tax and its fluctuations. The smaller is the degree of price stickiness, the higher are
the optimal inflation rate and inflation volatility and the lower are the optimal income tax rate and
income tax volatility. The Ramsey government can thus be understood as using inflation volatility
to ensure efficient labor market fluctuations, despite the fact that prices are sticky and changing
them are costly. Another important result is that even in the presence of labor tax rates and in spite
of the costly price adjustments, the Ramsey government finds it optimal to rely on inflation, not
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tax volatility, in order to induce efficient fluctuations in the labor market.
In the second essay, and in the context of the same macroeconomy model as in the first essay, I
show that, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, despite the presence of price adjustment costs,
once workers bargaining weight is low, strict inflation targeting is remarkably welfare detrimental.
At the same time the monetary rule that responds to output or labor market tightness yields signi-
ficantly lower welfare costs than the monetary rule that just targets inflation. I first compute the
welfare costs of strict inflation targeting and a rule that responds to output in the context of the
baseline monetary model without search and matching frictions. In line with the existing literat-
ure, I find that strict inflation targeting delivers a welfare level that is virtually identical to the one
obtained under the Ramsey-optimal policy and response to output is always welfare detrimental.
I then show that in the presence of labor market frictions and once the worker’s bargaining power
is low, while strict inflation targeting is significantly welfare detrimental, responding to labor mar-
ket tightness or output can be considerably welfare improving compared to responding only to
inflation. This is specifically the case for the market tightness targeting. The numerical results
indicate that welfare losses associated with the rule that responds to the labor market tightness are
more than 95% lower than the welfare losses associated with the strict inflation targeting rule. I
also show that by raising the worker’s bargaining power to the Hosios level and higher, welfare
losses of the monetary rules drop significantly and response to output or market tightness does
not, anymore, imply lower welfare costs than the strict inflation targeting rule, which is in line
with the existing literature.
The third essay ( revision requested by the International Journal of Central Banking) deals with
the optimality of the Friedman rule, which is one of the most celebrated propositions in modern
monetary economics, in a DSGE model where a money demand by firms is motivated. Based on
this rule, the nominal interest rate should be zero. Studying the optimality of the Friedman rule
has become more important, recently, due to the situation that the central banks around the world
are confronted with. There have been many papers on the optimality of the Friedman rule under
different situations and assumptions. However, almost all of them has restricted their attention to
the case that it is only households that obtain a service flow from holding money. While, based on
the evidence, two-thirds of M1 in industrialized economies are held by firms. Therefore, I study
the optimality of the Friedman rule in monetary economies with distorting taxes on consumption
and where firms must borrow in order to finance some fraction of their wage bill. Introducing
such a constraint on wages has received a big boost from the evidence that firms were hurt during
the financial crisis, when they could not get access to credit to pay for working capital (see, e.g.,
Gilchrist et al. (2015)).
I first show that, irrespective of the form of the utility function, the Friedman rule ceases to
be optimal. This non-optimality is in line with the Phelps’s criticism that Friedman’s first best
3
argument ignores the second best fact that inflation produces seigniorage incomes for the fiscal
authority and all forms of taxation produce distortions of some kind. I then follow Jones et al.
(1997), and consider a model where households sell two types of labor, raw and effective labors, to
the market where only the raw labor wages are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint. I demon-
strate that, in this setup, the optimality of the Friedman rule with distorting consumption taxes
reemerged if the production function exhibits constant-returns-to-scale and the utility function is
a homothetic function of the mentioned two types of labor and separable in consumption.
4
Chapter 1
Frictional Labor Markets and the Optimal
Inflation Rate and its Variability
1.1 Introduction
Several papers, recently, have combined the search and matching paradigm into the DSGE frame-
works with sticky prices aim to explore the implications for optimal monetary policy. Almost
all of these studies are conducted in the context of theoretical frameworks which are cashless
and abstract from fiscal policy.1In this paper, I show that two important drawbacks due to these
unrealistic assumptions and simplifications arise: first, considering a cashless economy leaves un-
touched a very important policy problem, that is, the optimal rate of inflation. Indeed, the existing
literature on optimal monetary policy in the models with matching frictions is completely silent on
this and only focuses on the optimal inflation volatility. Second, treating the government budget
constraint as a residual object due to the presence of a lump-sum tax, significantly underestimates
the optimal inflation volatility and undermines the role of monetary policy-in particular, inflation-
in stabilizing the inefficient fluctuations in labor markets.
I develop a general equilibrium matching model with sticky prices, money and distortionary
labor income taxes, where it is possible to analyze the interactions between optimal fiscal and
monetary policies and have clear policy recommendations on optimal rate of inflation and its
volatility. The model is an extension of the DSGE labor search-and-matching and perfectly com-
petitive model of Arseneau and Chugh (2012). Arseneau and Chugh consider a real model that
is abstract from any nominal aspects. They show that their model generates reasonable business
cycle fluctuations of several key labor market outcomes. In their model, the government finances
1Arseneau and Chugh (2008) study optimal fiscal and monetary policy in a frictional labor market model with
costly nominal wage adjustments but flexible prices. Their model and results are different and in most cases in
contrast to this study. These differences and contrasts are discussed in detail below.
exogenous expenditures with revenue from distortionary labor income taxes, from dividend in-
come taxes and from issuing real state contingent debt. They also assume that, the government
provides vacancy subsidies and unemployment benefits. Arseneau and Chugh (2012) in their
paper, which is calibrated to the U.S. economy, find that the Ramsey-optimal policy calls for ex-
treme labor tax rate volatility. I depart from them by introducing market power, price rigidities and
money demands into their theoretical framework. Money is introduced into the model via cash-
in-advance constraints in such a way that holding liquidity balances facilitates the household’s
ability to purchase consumption goods and the firm’s ability to pay for the wage bill. Motivating a
working capital constraint for firms comes from the fact that more than 50 percent of M1 in indus-
trialized economies is held by firms. Unlike Arseneau and Chugh, in my model the government
debt is non-contingent nominal debt, which is more realistic, and there is no subsidy tax.
In this context, the crucial parameter for the results is the bargaining power of workers. This
parameter is also the key parameter for Arseneau and Chugh (2012), that they choose based on
the work of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). Hagedorn and Manovskii find that a reasonably
calibration of the parameters of the Mortensen-Pissarides model is consistent with the key business
cycle facts for the U.S. economy. Their calibration delivers the worker’s bargaining weight at a
relatively low value, 0.05. I pick this value as the baseline calibration as Arseneau and Chugh
did. For the other search and matching parameters, because the two models have the same labor
market structure, I also adopt the Arseneau and Chugh (2012) calibration.2 I then simulate four
different economies: the baseline monetary economy with distortionary taxes and labor market
frictions, the cashless form of the baseline monetary model with lump-sum taxes, the baseline
monetary economy with Walrasian wages (New Keynesian monetary model) and the traditional
cashless New Keynesian economy. The main results can be summarized as follows: In the baseline
model, the Ramsey-optimal rate of inflation is 9.6 percent per year with a volatility of 7.4 percent.
On the fiscal part, optimal fiscal policy is characterized by a highly volatile income tax rate,
although two percentage points less volatile than inflation. The labor income tax rate is on average
equal to 30% points with a volatility of 5.5%. The optimality of an extremely high inflation
rate which is also extremely volatile is a remarkable and striking result in two ways: first, once
we compare it with the results of the existing literature on Ramsey-optimal policy under sticky
prices in the Walrasian-based DSGE models with money and taxes or with the results of the
cashless models with frictional labor markets and lump-sum taxes. Indeed, the key finding of the
New Keynesian frameworks with Walrasian labor markets is that, once changing prices is costly,
price stability appears to be the central goal of optimal monetary policy, even when the model
features a rich array of real and nominal rigidities.3 Compared to the results of the papers with
2Different calibrations qualitatively deliver exactly the same results, but of course quantitatively different.
3See for example Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005b,a).
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labor market frictions that are abstract from money and tax, although it is true that a short-run
unemployment/inflation trade-off arises in these papers which makes the full price stability no
longer optimal, however, in most of them the trade-off resolves in favor of full price stability and
in all of them the optimal rate of inflation is zero and the optimal volatility of inflation is very
low.4
Second and more strikingly, even in the presence of labor tax rates and in spite of the costly
price adjustments, the Ramsey planner relies more heavily on inflation than tax volatility to induce
efficient fluctuations in the labor market and to stabilize the economy over the business cycle.
While one might expect that in this context monetary policy is the most appropriate instrument to
deal with the sticky price distortion and the labor tax rate is the most appropriate instrument to deal
with distortions in the labor market, the quantitative results, however, run against this prior and
make it quite clear that it is the inflation, not the labor tax, that plays the crucial role in inducing
optimal labor market fluctuations. Indeed, in this environment for a degree of price stickiness
that is three times smaller than the benchmark estimate, the optimal fiscal/monetary policy regime
features a labor income tax on average two percentage points lower (28%) and three percentage
points less volatile (2.5%) and an inflation that is on average 15% points higher (24.3%) and one
and a half percentage points more volatile (8.8%) than in the case with the benchmark calibration.
These findings are vastly different from their counterparts in the cashless economy with lump-
sum taxes and also the monetary and cashless Wlrasian-based New Keynesian models with sticky
prices. Moving to the cashless model with lump-sum taxes, the optimal policy features an optimal
rate of inflation near zero with a volatility of only 0.34 percent per year, which is even less than
the optimal inflation volatility in the New Keynesian monetary model without matching frictions
(0.5%), in line with the existing literature. In the standard New-Keynesian literature, even for
a miniscule degree of price stickiness (i.e., ten times below available empirical estimates) the
optimal volatility of inflation is very low (see for example, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b) and
Siu (2004)). While, this is even remarkably the case for the cashless economy with labor market
frictions, but in the monetary model with distortionary labor taxes and matching frictions, on
the one hand, once the degree of price stickiness is ten times smaller than the benchmark and the
bargaining power is at 0.05 level, then the optimal rate of inflation rises to about 58% and becomes
extremely volatile (10.1%). On the other hand, the average rate of income tax and its volatility
fall to 24% and 1.8%, respectively. In this case, if the whole consumption expenditures and wage
payments must be backed with cash, then the optimal labor income tax rate drops to just 10%.
These results are also comparable to the Arseneau and Chugh (2012) results. They find that the
Ramsey government uses purposeful tax volatility, orders of magnitude larger than the cornerstone
4See for example Thomas (2008), Faia (2009), Blanchard and Gali (2010) and Ravenna and Walsh (2011, 2012)
among many others.
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tax-smoothing result of the standard Ramsey literature, to induce efficient fluctuations in labor
markets, by keeping distortions constant over the business cycle. In contrast, in the context of this
framework, the main burden of inducing efficient fluctuations in labor markets falls on inflation
not taxes. Indeed, the smaller is the degree of price stickiness, the higher are the optimal inflation
rate and its variations and the lower are the income tax rate and its volatility. The point is not
that because taxes are distortionary the Ramsey planner finds it optimal to use inflation; since in
almost all of the existing literature on optimal fiscal and monetary policy in the Walrasian-based
New Keynesian frameworks the trade-off is overwhelmingly resolved in favor of price stability
even for very small degrees of price stickiness. The point is that in the context of a monetary New
Keynesian model with frictional labor markets, when the bargaining power on the part of workers
is low, which results in inefficiently-time-varying components of static and intertemporal wedges,
using inflation to induce efficient fluctuations in the wedges is more efficient than variations in
taxes, even if changing prices is costly. Put another way, the benefits of purposeful high inflation
rate and high inflation volatility in inducing small and efficient fluctuations in labor markets by
keeping intertemporal distortions low over the business cycle outweigh the inflation costs.
It is important to note that the reason behind the optimality of a high inflation rate is the pres-
ence of a cash-in-advance constraint on purchases of the consumption good. Optimal inflation
volatility dramatically rises from 7.4% to 12.3% per year and average inflation sharply drops from
9.6% to -0.73% per year in the absence of this constraint. In fact, the inflation rate is positive and
high only if households hold cash balances, otherwise it falls to below zero. Indeed, there is also
a trade-off between the average inflation and inflation volatility in the case of a cash constraint
for households. The reason behind it lies in two facts: first, money demand friction on the part of
households, on the one hand, enters directly into the Phillips curve and so has a direct effect on
inflation. On the other hand, such a friction also enters into the optimal vacancy creation condition
and the static and intertemporal wedges, which are due to the matching frictions. Taken together
all, not only the existence of the money demand friction by households per se induces the Ramsey
planner to use inflation to minimize intertemporal distortions to ensure efficient labor market fluc-
tuations, but also the fraction of the consumption expenditures that must be backed with monetary
assets has direct impact on the average rate of inflation. This is not, however, the case for the
firm’s capital constraint, since it doesn’t impact the Phillips curve directly, although the presence
of this constraint, due to the its negative impact on Nash-bargained real wages, induces, to some
extent, lower income tax rates.
By raising worker’s bargaining power to the Hosios level (0.4), the Ramsey-optimal policy
in the baseline model delivers an optimal inflation rate on average negative and close to zero (-
0.4%) with a very low variability (0.4%). In this case, in contrast to the baseline calibration of
bargaining parameter, even for a ten times smaller degree of price rigidity parameter, inflation sta-
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bility remains optimal. By deviating from the Hosios efficiency condition and increasing worker’s
bargaining power more, optimal inflation rate and its volatility decline more. This is also signi-
ficantly the case for the optimal income tax rate. Indeed, once the bargaining power is set to 0.9,
the optimal inflation rate and its variability fall to very near zero and the average income tax rate
declines by about 10 percentage points to 21% with an optimal volatility about 80% lesser (1%).
Taking these points together leads us to the implication that, the main reasons behind the op-
timality of an extremely high inflation rate which is also very volatile in the baseline calibrated
model are low bargaining power on the part of workers and the nonexistence of lump-sum taxes.
The mechanism of wedge-smoothing in Arseneau and Chugh (2012) applies here too. As they
mentioned and showed carefully, non-tax components of wedges are very important in determ-
ining the mapping from wedge-smoothing to the dynamics of taxes in their framework, but in
this context, also to the dynamics of inflation and nominal interest rates. In the baseline calib-
rated model, because worker’s bargaining power is inefficiently low, the optimal policy features
variations in inflation to offset inefficient fluctuations in the wedges. More precisely, the Ramsey
planner uses inflation to ensure efficient labor market fluctuations by minimizing static and inter-
temporal distortions over the business cycle despite the fact that changing prices is costly. In other
words, because of low employment rate and inefficient and very large movements in labor market
tightness, that can be thought of as the summary statistic of period t labor market outcomes, due
to the worker’s low bargaining power, and the fact that the government has no access to lump-sum
taxes but only distorting income taxes, it is optimal to use an appropriate combination of average
inflation and inflation volatility and to some extent tax variations to stabilize the labor market over
the business cycle.
While the results to some extent are in line with Arseneau and Chugh (2012), they are also
comparable but to some extent in contrast to Arseneau and Chugh (2008) results, the only paper
on the joint determination of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in frictional labor markets with
nominal rigidities. Arseneau and Chugh (2008) study optimal fiscal and monetary policy in a
cash-credit goods model with labor market frictions and costly nominal wage adjustments. In
their model, there is no imperfect competition and product prices are flexible. The main result
of their paper is that, in spite of the nominal wage rigidities, the optimal policy implies a highly
volatile price inflation. However, Arseneau and Chugh (2008) study differs from this work in three
very important dimensions: first, Arseneau and Chugh (2008) assume flexible product prices,
while price adjustment costs are at the center stage of my paper. Due to the flexibility of product
prices in their setup, therefore, the optimality of high inflation volatility is not surprising. Second,
they assume that the bargaining parameter is at its efficient level, while focusing on the role of
worker’s bargaining power is another central part of this work. Third, they do not address the
welfare costs of price stability and also do not provide quantitative results for the case that fiscal
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policy is absent, thus it is not clear how much important is the role of distortionary income taxes
and the absence of lump-sum taxation. On the other hand, my results, that are derived under the
presence of price adjustment costs and flexible real wages not nominal wage adjustment costs,
from two very important aspects, among many other aspects, are qualitatively in contrast to what
Arseneau and Chugh report: first, in Arseneau and Chugh (2008) paper, with increasing the period
of nominal wage adjustment costs, the optimal price inflation volatility rises substantially and
optimal nominal wage inflation volatility doesn’t show a clear trade-off. Because as table (2)
of their paper shows, the nominal wage volatility rises again for four quarters of nominal wage
stickiness in comparison with the three quarters of nominal wage stickiness. While in my paper
and under the presence of nominal price adjustment costs, the inverse of their findings, in fact,
happens and the relation between optimal price inflation volatility and price adjustment costs
parameter is negative. In other words, as the degree of price stickiness rises, the optimal price
inflation volatility declines substantially, which is very reasonable. Second, Arseneau and Chugh
(2008) results on the optimality of high inflation volatility are obtained under the Hosios efficiency
level, while at that level my results quite clearly show that price stability is the optimal policy. This
is the case even for a small degree of price rigidity.
Another central focus of the paper is to show how the welfare losses of inflation targeting
are remarkably high for low levels of workers bargaining power. Specifically, my results suggest
that there is a direct link between the welfare losses of price stability and bargaining power of
workers. For the baseline calibration, the welfare cost of price stability is extremely large and
more than 20% of the consumption stream under the Ramsey policy. This cost is about 50 times
of the price stability cost in the cashless economy, that is 0.4% of the consumption stream under
the optimal policy. In both economies, by raising worker’s bargaining power toward the Hosios
efficiency level, the welfare cost of strict inflation targeting reduces substantially such that for the
monetary economy it drops to about 0.11% and for the cashless economy to 0.08%. These results
are new in the literature in the sense that the existing literature focused only on the welfare casts
of price stability for the cases that either bargaining power is at the efficient level or higher than
that level. At the same time, the results are also at a sharp contrast to that part of the existing
literature that report a negligible welfare cost for strict inflation targeting. For example, Ravenna
and Walsh (2012) find that price stability delivers a level of welfare close to the level achieves
under an optimal monetary policy. They show this result in a cashless economy with lump-sum
taxes and for values of bargaining power at the Hosios efficient level (0.5) and higher (0.7). The
cashless part of my model with lump sum taxes confirms Ravenna and Walsh results and implies
a very low welfare cost once the workers bargaining power is for example 0.7, despite the fact that
unlike Ravenna and Walsh I do not assume an efficient steady state.
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Literature Review: There is a vast literature on the optimal monetary policy in New Keynesian
models with frictional labor markets. This literature, that incorporated nominal rigidities in the
form of price sluggishness, has focused only on monetary policy and has completely ignored fiscal
policy.5.
Regarding the role of worker’s bargaining parameter in determination of optimal inflation
volatility, my findings on the dynamic properties of the Ramsey economy with different values for
bargaining power, ω , are in a sharp contrast to what Faia (2009) reports. Faia (2009) in a model
with sticky prices a la Rotemberg and matching frictions finds that optimal monetary policy in
response to both productivity and government expenditure shocks deviates from price stability. In
her framework, which abstracts from money demand friction and fiscal policy regime, in response
to both shocks the optimal inflation volatility increases with the worker’s bargaining power. How-
ever, as is explained below, this sharp contrast goes back to the facts that her framework abstracts
from distortionary taxes and unemployment transfers.
Another related work to this study is Ravenna and Walsh (2012). Ravenna and Walsh (2012)
address the question of why price stability remains optimal even in the presence of labor market
distortions in standard New Keynesian models. They assume a government that has access to
non distorting revenue sources and always able to replicate the first best allocation. In contrast to
the present paper, they do not solve a constrained optimal taxation problem. By assuming a tax
policy that corrects the inefficiency wedges in the first order conditions of competitive equilibrium,
Ravenna and Walsh (2012) find that the welfare gains of optimal monetary policy that allows for
deviating from price stability is negligible, compared to the welfare that price stability policy
delivers when wages are Nash-bargained and the Hosios efficiency condition is met. But once
wages are fixed at a norm far from the related efficient steady-state, optimal monetary policy by
deviating from price stability delivers not negligible welfare gains. Comparing their results with
my results in the cashless and no-fiscal policy case (which is a specific part of the paper and not
the main focus), some points which are important to note are discussed below.
Regarding a highly positive steady-state optimal inflation rate in the presence of labor market
friction and CIA constraint for households, my findings are in line with WANG and XIE (2013).
WANG and XIE (2013) in a monetary growth model with cash constraint for both households
and firms and in the absence of distortionary taxes show that labor market frictions play a crucial
role through which the steady inflation influences the long-run real activities. The key elements in
their analysis are costly vacancy creation, job search and imperfect job matches. WANG and XIE
(2013) conduct their analysis in the context of a model with perfect competition and flexible prices
where in the absence of labor market frictions the optimal inflation rate is on average negative due
5See for example Chéron and Langot (2000), Walsh (2003), Thomas (2008), Faia (2008), Blanchard and Gali
(2010) and Ravenna and Walsh (2011) among many others.
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to the optimality of the Friedman rule. They do not study the business-cycle properties of the
Ramsey-optimal policy which is in fact the central piece of this study. In my model also because
of nominal rigidities and in the absence of matching and monetary frictions the optimal inflation
rate is close to zero even with distorting taxes. Introducing frictional labor markets makes the
intertemporal and static wedges highly inefficiently volatile, and so one tool of the Planner is to
use high inflation rate to lower these inefficient volatilities.
1.2 Model
The theoretical framework embeds nominal rigidities in the form of sluggish price adjustment a
la Rotemberg (1982), demands for money by households and firms and the ability of government
to issue only nominal non state-contingent debt into the simple DSGE economy model with labor
search and matching frictions of Arseneau and Chugh (2012). In contrast to Arseneau and Chugh,
I do not allow for vacancy subsidy and state-contingent real debt. Because I want to consider firms
which are price setters, final consumption is assumed to be a composite good, aggregated over a
continuum of goods with Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. Each good is produced by a monopolist, and
all producers produce output using only labor and are subject to an aggregate productivity shock.
The matching frictional part of the model features agents in three labor market states. They are
either employed, searching for a job or are outside of the labor force and enjoy their leisure.
I assume that there is a representative household with preferences described over consumption
Ct , search activity St , and the desired stock of employment Hht ,
E0
∞
∑
t=0
β tU
(
Ct ,St ,Hht
)
(1.1)
with
U
(
Ct ,St ,Hht
)
= u(Ct)−N
[
Hht +(1− ppt)St
]
, (1.2)
and
Ct =
[ˆ 1
0
c
ξ−1
ξ
it
] ξ
ξ−1
, (1.3)
where ppt denotes probability of job-finding, taken as given by households, cit is private con-
sumption of variety i ∈ [0,1] and ξ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. The
function N (.) is a function of the measured labor force, defines as
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LFPt = Hht +(1− ppt)St , (1.4)
which is strictly increasing and strictly convex in the size of the labor force LFPt . In each
period t, LFPt agents participate in the labor force and 1−LFPt do not participate. In the meas-
ured labor force definition, (1− ppt)St represents the measure of individuals who turn out to be
unsuccessful in finding a job. The measure Hht that is the fraction of household members who are
employed is defined as
Hht = (1−ρ)Hht−1+St ppt , (1.5)
where ρ stands for a constant rate of exogenous separations. More precisely, at the beginning
of each period t a fraction ρ of employment relationships that produced output and were active in
period t−1 breaks up.
The production function of each intermediate good i uses labor, H fit , according to
cit = ZtH
f
it , (1.6)
where Zt is an aggregate productivity shock. Total measure of workers H
f
t is
H ft =
ˆ 1
0
H fit di. (1.7)
The law of motion of Zt is given by
LnZt = ρzLnZt−1+ εzt , (1.8)
where ρz ∈ (−1,1) and εzt is an i.i.d. innovation with mean zero and standard deviation σ z.
1.2.1 Government
The government each period levies distorting labor income taxes, τht , prints money, Mt , and issues
one-period nominally risk-free bonds, Bt , to finance a stream of spending Gt that is exogenous,
stochastic and unproductive. It also pays unemployment benefits, (1− ppt)Stχ , to households.
It’s period-by-period budget constraint is given by
Mt +Bt +Ptτht WtH
h
t = Rt−1Bt−1+Mt−1+PtGt +(1− ppt)PtStχ, (1.9)
where Pt =
[´ 1
0 p
1−ξ
it
] 1
1−ξ is a nominal price index, Rt denotes the gross one-period nominal in-
terest rate and Wt is the real wage.
Rt−1Bt−1+Mt−1
Pt−1 ≡ At denotes total real government liabilities in
units of period t−1 goods at the end of period t−1.
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I assume that the logarithm of variable Gt follows a first-order autoregressive process of the
form
lnGt = (1−ρg) lnG+ρglnGt−1+ εgt , (1.10)
where ρg ∈ (−1,1) and G > 0 are parameters, and εgt is an i.i.d. innovation with mean zero
and standard deviation σg. The parameter G represents the non-stochastic steady-state level of
government expenditures.
1.2.2 Firms
Each good’s variety is produced by a monopolist which faces quadratic costs of adjusting prices
and has to hold money to satisfy a working-capital constraint. The demand for money by firms
is rationalized by imposing that wage payments be subject to a cash-in-advance constraint of the
form:
BPtWtH
f
it ≤M fit , (1.11)
where B is a parameter indicating the fraction of the wage bill that must be backed with cash.
Real wages, Wt , as described below, are determined through the Nash bargaining mechanism. The
wage-setting protocol is taken as given when firms maximize profits. M fit denotes the demand
for nominal money balances by firm i in period t. The firm i also posts ϑit vacancies with the
per-vacancy posting cost γ .
The sequence of budget constraints that firm i faces is:
M fit = M
f
it−1+PitYit−PtWtH fit −PtΦit−
θ
2
(
pit
pit−1
−1
)
ZtPtH
f
it −Ptγϑit . (1.12)
where θ2
(
pit
pit−1
−1
)
ZtH
f
it represents price adjustment costs, p
t
i is the price of good’s variety
i, θ measures the degree of price stickiness, γϑit represents costs of posted vacancies and Φit is
distributed profits.
Following Arseneau and Chugh (2012) I assume that each firm i begins period t with employ-
ment stock H ft−1 and the productive employment stock of such a firm in period t, H
f
t , depends on
its vacancy postings at that period and the random matching process. Let qqt denotes the probab-
ility that a given vacancy is filled by a worker which is taken as given by the firm. This probability
like the matching probability for households, ppt , is assumed to depend only on aggregate labor
market conditions.
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The representative firm discounts profits period-t using β t λtλ0 , which is the value to the house-
holds of receiving profits, and chooses
{
pit , H
f
it , m
f
it , ϑit
}
to solve the following maximization
problem in real terms:
Max Πit = E0
∞
∑
t=0
β t
λt
λ0
 pitPt yit−WtH fit + m
f
it−1
pit−1
−m fit− γϑit−
ϕ
2
(
pit
pit−1
−1
)2
yit
 , (1.13)
where pit ≡ PtPt−1 denotes the gross consumer price inflation rate.
Output yit = cit must satisfy the technology constraint (1.6) and the demand function
yit =
(
pit
Pt
)−ξ
Yt , (1.14)
where Yt = ZtH
f
t .
The maximization is also subject to eq. (1.11) and the following sequence of perceived laws
of motion for employment level
H fit = (1−ρ)H fi,t−1+qqtϑit . (1.15)
Let the Lagrange multiplier on the production constraint (1.14) be MCt , which is the marginal
cost of the representative firm.
As is common in the literature, I restrict attention to symmetric equilibria where all firms
charge the same price for the goods they produce. As a result pit = Pt for all t. But if they all
choose the same price, they face exactly the same demand. This in turn means that they will
each produce an equal amount and will hire an equal amount of labor (since they all face the same
aggregate TFP). So we drop the index i. Then the first-order conditions of the above maximization
problem yields the following equations
γ
qqt
= ZtMCt−Wt
[
1+B
(
1−R−1t
)]
+β (1−ρ)Et λt+1λt
γ
qqt+1
, (1.16)
1−θpit (pit−1)+βEt
(
λt+1
λt
)[
θpit+1 (pit+1−1)Yt+1Yt
]
= (1−MCt)ξ , (1.17)
In deriving eq. (1.16) I used in advance from the fact that the Euler equation (1.25) is satisfied.
Equation (1.16) is the job creation condition and equation (1.17) is the expectations augmented
Phillips curve. As equation (1.16) shows, the presence of a working-capital requirement intro-
duces a financial cost of labor that is increasing in the nominal interest rate in addition to the labor
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market frictions costs. The left side of (1.16) is the search costs associated with hiring
(
γ
qqt
)
. The
right side is the discounted expected value of profits from a match.
1.2.3 Households
The representative household minimizes spending on aggregate Ct by choosing the consumption
of different goods varieties according to
cit
Ct
=
(
pit
Pt
)−ξ
.
The budget constraint in terms of aggregates is written as
PtCt +Bt+1+Mht =
(
1− τht
)
PtWtHht +Rt−1Bt +M
h
t−1+(1− ppt)Stχ+Πt , t > 0 (1.18)
together with a no-Ponzi games condition.
The perceived laws of motion for the employment stock is
Hht = (1−ρ)Hht−1+ pptSt , (1.19)
And the demand for money originated in a cash-in-advance constraint takes the following form
APtCt ≤Mht , (1.20)
Bt+1 represent risk-free nominal bonds that the representative household holds, Mht is the
money holdings by the household in period t and A is a parameter. Also Πt =
´ 1
0 Φitdi are total
profits.
Denote by
{
λt
Pt
}
, {µt} and
{
ψt
Pt
}
the sequence of Lagrange multipliers on the constraints
(1.18), (1.19) and (1.20), respectively. The first order conditions of the household problem that
maximizes utility (1.1) subject to the above constraints with respect to the aggregates Ct , Mht , St ,
Hht and Bt+1 are
u
′
(Ct) = λt +ψt , (1.21)
λt
Pt
= β
λt+1
Pt+1
+A
ψt
Pt
, (1.22)
λt (1− ppt)χ+µt ppt = (1− ppt)N ′
[
(1− ppt)St +Hht
]
, (1.23)
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λt
(
1− τht
)
Wt +β (1−ρ)Etµt+1 = µt +N ′
[
(1− ppt)St +Hht
]
, (1.24)
λt
Pt
= βRt
λt+1
Pt+1
. (1.25)
Eq. (1.25) represents the standard pricing equation for nominal bonds. Conditions (1.21) and
(1.22) imply that
u
′
(Ct) = λt
[
1+A
(
1−R−1t
)]
, (1.26)
this equation states that the cash-in-advance constraint introduces a wedge between the mar-
ginal utility of consumption and the marginal utility of wealth.
From eq. (1.23) solve for the multiplier µt
µt =
(
1− ppt
ppt
)[
N
′ [
(1− ppt)St +Hht
]
−λtχ
]
. (1.27)
Combining eqs. (1.24) and (1.27) with eq. (1.4) that LFPt = Ht +(1− ppt)St , gives the house-
hold’s optimal labor force participation condition,
N
′
(LFPt)
pptλt =
(
1− τht
)
Wt−χ+ β (1−ρ)λt Et{λt+1
∗
(
1−ppt+1
ppt+1
)
[N
′
(LFPt+1)
ppt+1λt+1
−χ]}+
(
1−ppt
ppt
)
χ
, (1.28)
which is equivalent to
N
′
(LFPt)−χλt
ppt
= λt [
(
1− τht
)
Wt−χ]+
β (1−ρ)Et
{(
1−ppt+1
ppt+1
)[
N
′
(LFPt+1)−χλt+1
]}
.
The participation condition asserts that, the fraction of agents searching for jobs is determined in
such a way that at the optimum, the expected payoff of searching will be equal to the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and participation.
1.2.4 Nash-Bargained Wages
Following much of the literature I assume that wages are determined through Nash bargaining.
Like Arseneau and Chugh (2012), let define V
(
Hht−1
)
as the value function associated with
the household problem. Then envelope condition by using eq. (1.27) gives
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V
′ (
Hht−1
)
= (1−ρ)µt
= (1−ρ)
(
1−ppt
ppt
)[
N
′
(LFPt)−χλt
]
.
(1.29)
Let V Et denote the value of an employed member to a household. This value is defined after
labor matching has taken place and so the labor market status of each member’s measured is
known in period t. Let also define VUt as the value of an unemployed member to a household.
This value is defined before labor matching takes place. Thus, in contrast to the former case, the
participation decisions of household about how many members to be sent to search for jobs occur
before matching has taken place. 6
For a member who is employed, the valuation equation for being in a match that produces in
period t is
V Et =
(
1− τht
)
Wt +
β
λt
Et
(
λt+1
V
′ (
Hht
)
λt
)
, (1.30)
the first term on the right hand side of eq. (1.30) denotes real wages net of tax and the second
term which is based on envelope condition (1.29), stands for the marginal value of entering period
t +1 with another preexisting employment relationship. The value of an unsuccessful member in
finding a job is given in turn by
VUt = χ. (1.31)
Because a household re-optimizes participation at the beginning of period t + 1 and at this time
(1− ppt)St is not a state variable, there is zero continuation payoff of an unemployed member to
the household. It follows that the household’s surplus from an employment can be written as
V Et −VUt =
(
1− τht
)
Wt−χ+ β (1−ρ)λt
∗Et
{
λt+1 (1− ppt+1) N
′
(LFPt+1)−χλt+1
ppt+1λt+1
}
, (1.32)
where I used eq. (1.29) to get rid of V
′ (
Hht
)
. Comparing eqs. (1.32) and (1.28) reveals that
V Et −VUt =
N
′
(LFPt)−χλt
pptλt
, (1.33)
update this expression one period and substitute it in eq. (1.32) gives
V Et −VUt =
(
1− τht
)
Wt−χ+ β (1−ρ)λt
∗Et
{
λt+1 (1− ppt+1)
(
V Et+1−VUt+1
)} , (1.34)
6For a precise image of the timing of events see page 932 of Arseneau and Chugh (2012).
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Note also that the firm’s surplus from an established employment relationship, denoted by ϒt ,
is given by
ϒt = ZtMCt−Wt
[
1+B
(
1−R−1t
)]
+
β (1−ρ)
λt
Et (λt+1ϒt+1) , (1.35)
where ϒt = γqqt .
I assume a constant-return-to-scale matching function of the form
m(St ,ϑt) = ζSκt ϑ
1−κ
t , (1.36)
Here St and ϑt denote aggregate variables, because I assume that we are in equilibrium. From
eq. (1.36) we get qqt = ζQ−κt and ppt = ζQ1−κt , where Qt =
ϑt
St
is the measure of labor market
tightness.
Because of the equilibrium Ht = H
f
t = Hht , hence the aggregate employment is given by
Ht = (1−ρ)Ht−1+m(St ,ϑt) . (1.37)
Let denotes by ω ∈ (0,1) the worker’s bargaining power. Naturally, the firm’s bargaining
power will be 1−ω . Under Nash bargaining, workers and firms choose Wt to maximize
(
V Et −VUt
)ω ϒ1−ωt .
This maximization problem implies the following sharing rule
V Et −VUt
ϒt
=
ω
1−ω
(
1− τht
)[
1+B
(
1−R−1t
)] , (1.38)
Now by using eqs. (1.16), (1.34) and (1.38) we get the following wage equation
Wt = ωZtMCt[1+B(1−R−1t )]
+ (1−ω)
(1−τht )
χ+βω (1−ρ)
∗{λt+1λt
γ
qqt+1
[ 1
[1+B(1−R−1t )]
− (1− ppt+1)(1−τ
h
t+1)
(1−τht )
1
[1+B(1−R−1t+1)]
]}
(1.39)
As the first term of real wage equation (1.39) shows, the presence of the working capital
constraint distorts and decreases the value of the marginal product of a new worker ZtMCt to the
firm. This is also the case for the forward-looking aspect of employment, which is captured in the
last term of eq. (1.39). (1−ω)
(1−τht )
χ shows the part of wage payments that goes to the household.
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1.3 Ramsey Problem
I follow the form of policy commitment that in the literature is known as the ”optimal from the
timeless perspective”. This means that, in choosing optimal policy, the government is assumed to
honor its commitments made in the past. The problem of the Ramsey planner is to raise revenue
to finance exogenous government expenditures through issuance of one-period nominally risk-
free government debt, labor income taxes and money creation, in such a way that maximizes the
welfare of the representative household, subject to the equilibrium conditions of the economy.
The Ramsey problem in this economy, given At , the fixed parameter χ and exogenous stochastic
processes {Gt , Zt}∞t=0 is a set of endogenous processes{
Ct , Ht , St , Bt , Mht , Mt , M
f
t ,Wt , Rt , ϑt , Pt , τht , λt , MCt
}∞
t=0
that maximizes eq. (1.1) subject to the eqs. (1.9), (1.16), (1.17), (1.25), (1.28), (1.39), the
aggregate resource constraint
Yt =Ct +Gt +
θ
2
(pit−1)2Yt + γϑt (1.40)
the total aggregate nominal balances constraint
Mt = Mht +M
f
t = APtCt +BPtWtHt (1.41)
In principle, the constraint Rt ≥ 1 that ensures the chosen allocation can be supported as a
monetary equilibrium must also be imposed. However, because in the steady-state of this model Rt
is always greater than one and the lower bound Rt = 1 was never reached in any of the simulations
of the model without this constraint, I therefore proceed from here on dropping it from the Ramsey
problem.7
1.4 Calibration
I take a period to be a quarter. The structural parameter values implied by the calibration are
summarized in table (1.1) . I adopt utilities
u(Ct) = lnCt and N (LFPt) =
υ
1+1/φ
LFP1+1/φt ,
7Although focus of my study is not the role of unemployment transfers and their absence which is empirically an
unrealistic assumption, it is worth pointing out the only case that the lower bound was violated most of the time was
when the unemployment transfers were absent in the baseline monetary economy with distortionary taxes.
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where I set the parameter scaling the disutility of labor market effort υ = 7.7 to deliver a
steady-state participation rate of 66 percent. I set φ = 1, which is a very common value in the
literature. The discount factor is set to be β = 0.99, which implies that in the steady-state real
interest rate is about four percent. Following Basu and Fernald (1997), I assume that the value
added mark-up of prices over marginal cost is equal to 0.25. To calibrate the degree of price stick-
iness, I follow Chugh (2006) and derive the mapping between the parameter θ in the Rotemberg
quadratic price adjustment cost and the probability f of receiving a signal to change prices in the
price-stickiness of Calvo apparatus. This mapping delivers the following relationship between θ
and f
θ =
1− f
f
1
1−β (1− f ) ,
If we assume that the average duration of a price is four quarters, then we get a value for
f equal to 14 . Therefore, in the present model which is a quarterly model since β = 0.99, the
corresponding Rotemberg parameter is thus θ = 13.5. Chugh (2006) sets this value equal to 5.88
because he assumes that on average 1/3 of firms set price in a given period.
Using postwar U.S. data, I measure the average money-to-output ratio as the ratio of M1 to
GDP, that implies a value equal to 18.3 percent per year. I then use this calibration and calibrate
parameters of cash constraints A and B and set them equal to 0.38 and 0.52, respectively.
Because the structure of the presented matching model is precisely the same as the framework
of Arseneau and Chugh (2012), I rely on their calibration for all of the matching parameters.8
However, it’s worth mentioning that except for the bargaining power, the calibration of all other
parameters are in line with the literature. The bargaining parameter, ω , the unemployment benefits
χ , the quarterly probability of separation ρ and vacancy elasticity of matches 1−κ are set to 0.05,
0.76, 0.1 and 0.6, respectively. I set the values of matching rate for a searching individual ppt ,
the fixed cost of opening a vacancy γ , and the job-filling rate of a vacancy qqt and the matching
parameter ζ equal to ppt = 0.61, γ = 0.27, qqt = 0.9, ζ = 0.77. The fraction of searching workers
St in the steady-state is set to 0.08. I set the persistence parameters and the standard deviations
of the exogenous processes of the government expenditure shock and the productivity shock such
that
(
ρg, εgt
)
= (0.95, 0.027) and (ρz, εzt ) = (0.95, 0.006). These values are very in line with
Arseneau and Chugh (2012) and the related literature. Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007)
and Arseneau and Chugh (2012), I also choose G to be 17% of output.
Concerning the numerical accuracy and sensitivity of the results to the calibration, although
not reported here, I find qualitatively precisely the same results once I adopt different forms of
utility functions or different calibrations for the search and matching frictions. However, different
8For a very detailed explanation on how the parameters are calibrated please see Arseneau and Chugh (2012).
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calibrations do matter for precise quantitative policy predictions.
Table 1.1: Baseline Calibration
Calibrated Parameters Value
β Discount factor 0.99
θ Price stickiness parameter 13.5
ξ The value added mark-up of prices 0.25
υ Preference Parameter 7.7
φ Elasticity of participation w.r.t wages 1
A Fraction of consumption held in money 0.38
B Fraction of wage payments held in money 0.52
z Steady state productivity shock 1
ρg Serial correlation of lngt 0.95
σ z Std. dev of innovation to lnzt 0.006
σg Std. dev of innovation to lngt 0.027
ρz Serial correlation of lnzt 0.95
γ Fixed cost of posting vacancy 0.27
ζ Matching function parameter 0.77
ω Worker’s bargaining power 0.05
χ Unemployment benefits 0.76
κ Elasticity of aggregate matches 0.4
ρ Job separation rate 0.1
1.5 Optimal Ramsey Policy
To study the business-cycle properties of Ramsey-optimality policy I approximate the Ramsey
equilibrium dynamics by solving a second-order approximation to the Ramsey equilibrium con-
ditions around the non-stochastic steady-state of these conditions. My numerical method is the
perturbation algorithm described by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) which has been implemen-
ted by them for example in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007, 2004b, 2005b). In computing the
sample moments of interested variables, all structural parameters of the model take the values
shown in table 1. Second moments are calculated using Monte Carlo simulations. I conduct 500
simulations, each 100 periods long. For each simulation, I compute sample moments and then
average these figures over the 500 simulations.
1.5.1 Results
Table (1.2) presents simulation results for the four-mentioned economies in the introduction and
for different values of the price stickiness parameter. The first economy and the more interested
one is the baseline search and matching monetary economy with distortionary labor taxes and
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cash-in-advance constraints for households and firms. The dynamics of this economy are presen-
ted in the first column of table (1.2). The second economy, which its dynamics are shown in
the second column, is the cashless economy with lump-sum taxes and labor market frictions. This
economy is the same as the common economy in the existing literature on optimal monetary policy
with sticky prices and frictional labor markets. The third economy, presented in the third column,
is the baseline monetary economy without frictional labor markets. The last column presents dy-
namics of the cashless economy with lump-sum taxes and Walrasian labor markets (Canonical
New Keynesian model). Panel A presents results for the baseline structural parameters, Panel
B presents results for a degree of price stickiness 3 times smaller than the baseline calibration,
and Panel C presents dynamics for a degree of price stickiness 10 times smaller than the baseline
structural value. Each of these experiments is conducted keeping all other structural parameters
fixed at their baseline settings.
The most striking feature of the Ramsey allocations that emerges from table 2 is that, in the
baseline monetary model and with the baseline calibration for the price stickiness parameter θ ,
under the optimal policy regime inflation rate is remarkably high and volatile over the business
cycle, as Panel A shows. A two-standard deviation band on each side of the mean features an
inflation rate of 2.2 percent at the lower end and an inflation rate of 17.1 percent at the upper end.
On the other hand, labor income taxes are also far from zero and very volatile. The average value
of the labor income tax rate in the baseline model is 30% with a standard deviation that is 5.5
percentage points. The Ramsey planner uses variations in inflation as a tool to induce efficient
labor market fluctuations despite the fact that changing prices is costly. The high volatility and
high average rate of the inflation in the context of the baseline model stands in sharp contrast to the
near zero and smooth behavior of the inflation rate in the other three models, as the second, third
and fourth columns display. More precisely, in the case of cashless frictional labor market model
with lump sum taxes, the optimal rate of inflation is close to zero with a volatility about only
0.34%. The 0.34% is even less than the optimal inflation volatility in the standard New Keynesian
monetary economy, presented in the third column of Panel A, where the optimal rate of inflation
and its volatility are also low and equal to 0.74% and 0.54%, respectively. The fourth column
represents the standard results in the standard New-Keynesian models that the optimal inflation
rate is zero in a cashless economy with no-fiscal policy. The reason that the optimal volatility is
not exactly zero, although still very near zero, is that I do not assume the government can subsidize
production to undo imperfect competition distortions.
Another remarkable result that emerges from inspection of Table 2 is that, unlike the other
three models, in the baseline model there is a tradeoff between the optimal rate of inflation and
its variability and the optimal income tax rate and its volatility. When θ is reduced by a factor
of 3, Panel B, the optimal rate of inflation sharply increases by a factor of 2.5 and its volatility
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rises to 8.8%. On the other hand, the mean and standard deviation of the labor tax rate decline
significantly. The average value of the income tax rate falls to 28% with a volatility about 55%
lesser. The second column of Panel B shows that this is, however, not the case in the cashless
economy with lump-sum taxation where there is almost no change in the optimal inflation rate
and its volatility. This is also the case in the Walrasian-based models, as the last two columns
present. These columns show that despite the reduction of the price stickiness parameter the
optimal inflation variability remains virtually unchanged, in line with the existing literature. There
is also no significant change in the optimal inflation and labor income tax rates in the monetary
economy with frictionless labor markets and the standard New-Keynesian framework.
Once I reduce the price stickiness parameter by a factor of 10, in the baseline model, on
the one hand the optimal rate of inflation dramatically rises to more than 58% per year with
an extreme volatility of 10.1% and on the other hand, the income tax rate drops to 24% with a
much lower volatility about just 1.8%.9 It is important to note that, in this case, if the whole
consumption expenditures and wage payments be subject to the cash constraints (A = B = 1),
then the optimal income tax is just 10%. These results are all the more striking when we compare
them to the cashless economy with Nash-bargained wages and lump-sum taxes and the monetary
economy with Walrasian wages and the benchmark New-Keynesian model. As columns 2, 3 &
4 clearly show there are very small changes in the optimal inflation volatility in these cases even
with a degree of price stickiness 10 times smaller. While the optimal inflation rate remains zero
regardless of the price stickiness parameter in the Canonical New-Keynesian model, it rises to
just 3.4% in the standard New-Keynesian model added with monetary frictions and distortionary
income taxes.
9I deliberately chose 10 because as I mentioned in the introduction and I also showed it clearly in the third and
fourth columns of table 2, it is a very well known result in the standard New-Keynesian literature that even for a
miniscule degree of price stickiness 10 times smaller than the existing calibration the optimal inflation rate and its
volatility remain close to zero.
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Table 1.2: Ramsey-optimal policy
variable baseline monetary economy no-fiscal cashless economy frictionless labor-monetary economy frictionless labor-cashless economy
mean Std.dev Autocorrelation mean Std.dev Autocorrelation mean Std.dev Autocorrelation mean Std.dev Autocorrelation
A. θ = 68 (baseline Calibration )
τh 30 5.5 0.1285 - - - 20.6 0.44 0.6778 - - -
pi 9.6 7.4 0.1735 0.01 0.34 0.8652 0.74 0.54 0.6988 0.000 0.04 0.2805
R 13.9 4.3 0.5734 4.6 7.7 0.8905 4.8 0.2 0.7394 4.4 6.8 0.9034
out put 0.49 0.009 0.7519 0.49 0.008 0.8848 0.31 0.005 09032 0.34 0.005 0.9082
B. θ = 22.5 (three times smaller )
τh 28 2.5 0.3477 - - - 20.3 0.4 0.9160 - - -
pi 24.3 8.8 0.3203 0.01 0.39 0.8531 2.3 0.55 0.5790 0.000 0.05 0.1012
R 29.2 6.01 0.7149 4.5 8.2 0.8862 6.5 0.16 0.7683 4.7 6.6 0.8981
out put 0.49 0.009 0.7486 0.49 0.0083 0.7683 0.31 0.005 0.8992 0.4 0.0058 0.9034
C. θ = 6.8 (ten times smaller )
τh 24.1 1.8 0.7923 - - - 19.2 0.36 0.9736 - - -
pi 58.1 10.1 0.4511 0.01 0.48 0.8441 3.4 0.7 0.3681 0.000 0.06 0.0187
R 64.3 7.4 0.7941 4.3 8.1 0.8911 11.8 0.13 0.9177 4.8 6.7 0.8996
out put 0.49 0.008 0.7884 0.49 0.0084 0.9009 0.31 0.0047 0.8982 0.38 0.006 0.9107
Note: τh, pi and R are expressed in percentage points and out put in level.
1.5.2 Equilibrium Wedges
In this subsection, I try to briefly shed light on the inefficiencies that arise in the allocations
of labor market, due to the several assumed distortions, and then use them to explain why the
optimal policy, when the worker’s bargaining power is low, features a high inflation rate which
is also highly volatile, in the monetary economy with frictional labor markets. In doing so, it is
useful to relate my model to the simple DSGE labor search and matching model of Arseneau and
Chugh (2012). In their paper, they nicely provide a welfare-relevant concept of efficiency that
makes it clear under what conditions tax smoothing is optimal and is not. Applying their welfare-
relevant notion of efficiency and labor wedges to the monetary and fiscal policy questions of my
model allows me to pinpoint the conditions under which a high inflation rate with high volatility
is optimal.
The two following conditions are the efficient ”zero wedge” conditions for Ramsey allocation
which both are related to the labor market:
N
′
(LFPt)
u′ (Ct)
= γ
κ
1−κQt , (1.42)
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γQκt
ζ (1−κ) −Zt = (1−ρ)Et{
βu′(Ct+1)
u′(Ct)
∗[1−ζκQ1−κt+1 ] γQκt+1ζ (1−κ) , (1.43)
N
′
(LFPt)
u′(Ct)
Q(κ−1)t
ζκ −Zt = (1−ρ)Et{
βu′(Ct+1)
u′(Ct)
N
′
(LFPt+1)
u′(Ct+1)
∗Q
(κ−1)
t+1
ζκ
[
1− ζκ
Q(1−κ)t+1
] (1.44)
These conditions obtained by maximizing eq. (1.1) subject to the eqs. (1.37) and (1.40).
The first equation (1.42) is the static marginal rate of transformation between consumption and
labor force participation and the second and third equations (1.43) and (1.44) are the intertemporal
marginal rate of transformation between consumption and LFP which state that if the economy
consumes one unit less in period t then how many additional units it can achieve in period t +1.
The last two equations are equivalent if the first one holds.
The equilibrium wedges that arise in the decentralized monetary economy change the above
efficient conditions as follows:
N
′
(LFPt)
u′(Ct)
= 1
[1+A(1−R−1t )]
{χ+ (1− τht )γ ω1−ωQt 1[1+B(1−R−1t )]}
= γ κ1−κQt{χ(1−κ)γκQt 1[1+A(1−R−1t )]
+
(
1− τht
) ω(1−κ)
(1−ω)κ
1
[1+B(1−R−1t )]
1
[1+A(1−R−1t )]
}
, (1.45)
γQκt
ζ = ZtMCt
(
1− ω
[1+B(1−R−1t )]
)
− (1−ω)
(1−τht )
χ
+
(1−ρ)β [1+A(1−R−1t )]
u′(Ct)
Et{ γQ
κ
t+1
ζ
u
′
(Ct+1)
[1+A(1−R−1t+1)]
[1− ω
[1+B(1−R−1t )]
+
ω(1−τht+1)
(1−τht )
1
[1+B(1−R−1t+1)]
(
1−ζQ1−κt+1
)
]}
(1.46)
Condition (1.45) obtained by using eqs. (1.16), (1.28) and (1.34). Condition (1.46) obtained by
substituting the Nash wage outcome (1.39) into the vacancy creation condition (1.16). Compar-
ison of (1.45) with (1.42) and (1.46) with (1.43) and (1.44) reveal the within-period and inter-
temporal wedges. The wage determination mechanism, the imperfect competition which makes
MCt different from 1, distorting labor taxes, and the two cash constraints are the four features that
create inefficiencies in the above listed conditions. Important to note from eq. (1.45) is that, if
worker’s bargaining power ω were zero, then neither tax rate nor firm’s working capital constraint
26
would have any effect on the within period wedge. This is not true for the cash constraint for
households. This condition also makes it clear that sufficient conditions to achieve within-period
(static) efficiency are that the decentralized economy features A = B = χ = τh = 0 and κ = ω .
The mentioned conditions are not necessary conditions because for example for any value for χ ,
κ , A, B and ω different from zero, a suitable setting of nominal interest rate Rt and labor tax rate
τht can achieve efficiency.
Achieving intertemporal efficiency (zero intertemporal distortions) is not, however, possible
once we look at it through the lens of condition (1.46). The reason behind it is that even if all the
above mentioned parameters were zero, still because of the nominal rigidities in the form of price
stickiness and the imperfect competition MCt 6= 1.
1.5.3 Analysis and Intuition
The most important policy implication of the models featuring a New Keynesian Phillips curve
and Walrasian labor markets (as the third and fourth columns of table (1.2) display) is the optim-
ality of price stability. This policy implication is also the case and survives in a cashless economy
with lump-sum taxes and matching frictions (as the second column of the table shows), for the
whole range of bargaining weight on the workers part and even a price stickiness parameter 10
times smaller than the baseline calibration. The reason for this optimality is that it eliminates the
inefficiencies brought about by the presence of price-adjustment costs. This optimality insight,
however, doesn’t apply to the present monetary model with distorting taxes and frictional labor
markets, as these frictions generate an unemployment/inflation trade-off. The trade-off is over-
whelmingly resolved in favor of unemployment once worker’s bargaining weight is low enough.
As I mentioned before and the condition (1.46) clearly shows, the decentralized economy not only
doesn’t achieve efficient fluctuations in the long run but also along the business cycles, hence, the
optimal policy would be to minimize distortions as much as possible over the business cycles.
With low worker bargaining power, not only surplus sharing that goes to workers is very low
but more importantly it makes the static and intertemporal wedges to fluctuate very inefficiently
that in turn lead to highly inefficient fluctuations in employment and labor market tightness, which
is in fact a good summary statistic for labor market outcomes. And since the intertemporal effi-
ciency or in my model minimizing intertemporal inefficiencies is the paramount concern of the
social planner, it uses an appropriate combination of time-varying inflation, nominal interest rate
and labor taxes to take care of the concern and reduces the inefficient fluctuations in the wedges.
However, the results presented above make it quite clear that it is the inflation rate that plays the
major role in inducing efficient fluctuations in the labor markets. By raising the bargaining power
ω , surplus sharing shifts toward workers and leads to substantial reductions in the inefficient fluc-
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tuations in labor market tightness Qt .10 Therefore, the Ramsey planner finds it optimal to keep
volatilities of inflation and tax rates very low since changing the former is costly and the later is
distortionary and inefficient.
Table 1.3: Ramsey-optimal policy with different values for ω
variable baseline monetary economy no-fiscal cashless economy
mean Std.dev Autocorrelation mean Std.dev Autocorrelation
A. w = 0.1
τh 30.6 4.7 0.1819 - - -
pi 2.5 6.1 0.1472 0.005 0.23 0.8540
R 6.6 2.5 0.8034 3.8 7.7 0.8957
out put 0.49 0.012 0.8448 0.49 0.008 0.8984
B. ω = 0.2
τh 30.7 2.2 0.4045 - - -
pi 0.76 2.8 0.1321 0.002 0.12 0.7217
R 4.8 1.08 0.8567 4.2 7.7 0.8883
out put 0.49 0.01 0.9050 0.49 0.008 0.8995
C. ω = 0.4
τh 27.8 1.05 0.9401 - - -
pi -0.39 0.44 0.0403 0.002 0.04 -0.0866
R 3.7 0.41 0.7313 4.6 7.3 0.8946
out put 0.49 0.009 0.9087 0.49 0.0075 0.9038
D. ω = 0.9
τh 21.4 1.01 0.8767 - - -
pi -0.1 0.13 0.0066 0.0000 0.01 -0.1130
R 3.9 0.44 0.4810 4.5 6.3 0.8790
out put 0.49 0.007 0.9042 0.48 0.006 0.9025
Note: τh, pit and Rt are expressed in percentage points and out put in level.
Table (1.3) reports Ramsey optimal policy for the baseline monetary economy with distorting
taxes and the cashless counterpart with lump-sum taxes for different values of ω . Both columns of
the table quite clearly show that worker’s bargaining weight and the optimal inflation rate and its
volatility are related negatively. This negative relationship is also the case between the bargaining
power and the optimal income tax rate and its volatility in the baseline model. Panel C shows how
in the baseline model the optimal rate of inflation and its variability decline remarkably to near
zero once the Hosios efficiency condition is satisfied. In this case, the optimal volatility of tax
rate also drops by more than 80%. In fact, in both economies by increasing workers bargaining
power ω both the optimal fluctuations in inflation pit and the optimal rate of inflation substantially
decline. This is also the case for the nominal interest rate Rt and labor taxes τht . Figure (1.1) shows
10Although not reported here, the simulation results evidently show that the standard deviations of labor market
tightness, employment and the fraction of searching people drop remarkably by raising worker’s bargaining power.
28
the negative relationship between the standard deviation of inflation and the worker’s bargaining
power ω in a more clear way.
This negative relationship contrasts sharply with the conclusions from a related analysis in
Faia (2009). Faia derives optimal monetary policy in a model with matching frictions, monopol-
istic and sticky prices. More precisely, she finds that in response to government expenditure and
technology shocks the optimal inflation volatility increases with the worker’s bargaining power.
There are, however, several contrasts between her framework and analysis and mine. First, she
doesn’t explicitly focus on sample moments of Ramsey-optimal policy and doesn’t report them,
while at the center stage of this paper is the calculation of the moments using Monte Carlo sim-
ulations.11 Second, Faia assumes lump sum taxes and so no fiscal policy. Third, she doesn’t
incorporate a labor force participation decision in her model and households utility function is a
function of only consumption. Fourth, in Faia model, the steady state inflation rate is zero. Fifth,
the standard deviation of inflation in her model for different values of bargaining power is also
extremely low and in the range of (0.02-0.12) which in the present framework are accounted as
near zero.
Nevertheless, for different versions and different calibrations of the model I get qualitatively
exactly the same results. This, as we saw above in table (1.3), is also the case with lump-sum
taxation. However, if in the model with lump-sum taxes, in order to make my model as close as
possible to Faia model, the unemployment transfers are assumed to be zero (χ = 0) and households
are assumed to derive no direct utility from leisure (υ = 0), then I get qualitatively the same results
as Faia, but of course quantitatively the results are different.
Important to note is that, as the second column of Panel B shows, the optimal inflation volatility
is not exactly zero in the cashless economy with lump-sum taxes once the Hosios efficiency is
met. There are two reasons for this. First, as is mentioned in the introduction, I do not assume
the government subsidizes the economy to undo imperfect competition distortion. Second, χ is
different from zero.
The reason behind a very high and positive optimal inflation rate in the baseline monetary
economy, is the presence of a money demand for households. To understand this, we should
analyze the impacts of such a demand on the New Keynesian Phillips curve. By merging eqs.
(1.17) and (1.26), the New Keynesian Phillips curve takes the following form
pit (pit−1) = βEt
(
u
′
(Ct+1)
u′(Ct)
[
1+A
(
1−R−1t
)][
1+A
(
1−R−1t+1
)])[pit+1 (pit+1−1)Yt+1Yt
]
+[1− (1−MCt)ξ ]/θ ,
(1.47)
11This is the method that has been used by Arseneau and Chugh (2012, 2008); Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005b,
2004,b, 2007); Siu (2004) among many others.
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Figure 1.1: Degree of Bargaining Power and Optimal Inflation Volatility. The Standard Deviation of Inflation Is Measured in Percent per
year.
This optimal price-setting behavior makes it quite clear that the current and expected inflation
are functions of household’s money demand friction. Because of the presence of both current
and future nominal interest rate, finding an explicit relation between inflation rate and money
demand friction is not possible and the mapping is a complicated endogenous object than can
be approximated only quantitatively. Table (1.4) presents simulation results for different pairs
of (A, B) for the baseline monetary economy with matching frictions and the baseline monetary
economy with Walrasian-based wages.
In the economy with Walrasian-based wages there is no significant change in the optimal
inflation volatility and the optimal rate of inflation also remains very low. Only for A = 1 the
optimal inflation rate rises to 1.6 percent per year. But in the case of baseline model when wages
are Nash-bargained and households have motivations to hold money, then the optimal inflation
rate is very high and for the baseline calibration is as high as 9.6% per year. Once the fraction of
consumption expenditures for households that must be backed by money rises to 100% (A = 1),
as the first column of Panel C shows, on the one hand the optimal inflation rate rises to 16.4%
and its optimal volatility drops to 3% and on the other hand significantly lesser labor tax volatility
becomes optimal. This is not, however, the case once only firms have motivations for holding
cash balances. As Panel A shows, in this case, whilst the optimal rate of inflation is on average
negative and low, both the optimal inflation and income tax variabilities are about 4% higher than
the case of cash constraint only for households.
These results, along with the results presented in table 2, make it again quite clear that the
optimal inflation rate and its volatility and the optimal income tax rate and its variability are
related negatively. Indeed, this is also the case between the optimal rate of inflation and the
optimal inflation volatility. An inspection of table 3 shows that when the optimal inflation rate is
quite high the optimal inflation volatility is significantly lower than the cases where the optimal
inflation rate is on average low and negative. To understand the intuition behind these results, we
should consider the New-Keynesian Phillips curve with monetary friction (1.47) along with static
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and intertemporal wedges conditions (1.45) and (1.46) and the Nash-bargained wage condition
(1.39) together and as a system. Once workers bargaining power is low, inefficient labor market
fluctuations are high and very costly. Hence, due to the presence of money demand friction for
households, the Ramsey government finds it optimal to use a very high inflation rate which is not
very volatile to ensure efficient fluctuations and also to stabilize the labor market over the business
cycle. In the absence of the household’s money demand friction, however, the Ramsey-optimal
policy calls for an extremely volatile inflation rate along with high variations in income taxes to
achieve efficient fluctuations.
Table 1.4: Ramsey-optimal policy for different values of (A, B)
variable monetary economy with matching frictions frictionless labor-monetary economy
mean Std.dev Autocorrelation mean Std.dev Autocorrelation
A. (A, B) = (0, 0.52)
τh 30.7 9.4 0.2036 20.7 0.41 0.6663
pi -0.73 12.3 0.0261 -0.04 0.55 0.7138
R 2.9 7.3 0.1563 3.9 0.3 0.3967
out put 0.49 0.013 0.5512 0.31 0.005 0.8999
B. (A, B) = (0.38, 0)
τh 30.6 6.2 0.0837 20.5 0.42 0.6577
pi 9.1 7.1 0.1653 0.75 0.54 0.7187
R 13.4 4.8 0.5858 4.8 0.2 0.8205
out put 0.49 0.0098 0.6563 0.31 0.005 0.9005
C. (A, B) = (1, 0)
τh 28.5 2.5 0.2371 20.03 0.43 0.6591
pi 16.4 3.04 0.3499 1.6 0.5 0.6815
R 21.1 2.7 0.6711 6.1 0.15 0.9044
out put 0.49 0.008 0.7959 0.31 0.005 0.9009
D. (A, B) = (0, 0)
τh 30 11.1 0.1568 20.6 0.4 0.6297
pi -0.17 12.7 0.0416 -0.03 0.5 0.7196
R 3.5 8.1 0.2077 4 0.22 0.4836
out put 0.49 0.015 0.5600 0.31 0.005 0.9005
E. (A, B) = (1, 1)
τh 25.7 2.3 0.3962 19.9 0.45 0.7164
pi 16.7 3.3 0.3381 1.9 0.5 0.6512
R 21.4 2.7 0.6625 6.02 0.14 0.8803
out put 0.49 0.0075 0.8439 0.31 0.005 0.9031
Note: τh, pit and Rt are expressed in percentage points and out put in level.
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1.6 Welfare Measuring
Like some of the recent widespread application of DSGE models with matching frictions, I con-
duct policy evaluations by computing the welfare cost of a particular monetary/fiscal policy re-
gime relative to the time-invariant equilibrium process associated with the Ramsey policy. The
particular policy regime that I focus on is the strict inflation targeting policy which is a stand-
ard comparison in the matching literature. To measure the welfare costs I follow Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2007, 2005b) and use their procedure to conduct policy evaluations by computing the
welfare losses of strict inflation targeting regime relative to the time-invariant equilibrium process
associated with the Ramsey policy. I estimate the welfare conditional on a particular state in period
0 where all state variables of the economy equal their respective Ramsey-steady-state values and
the policy regime has the same steady state. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) find that conducting
policy evaluations conditional on an initial state different from the Ramsey steady state deliver
similar results. Let the Ramsey-optimal policy and the strict inflation targeting policy be denoted
by RP and IP, respectively. Let also the equilibrium processes for consumption and labor force
participation associated with a particular policy be {Ct , LFPt} . Then welfare is measured as the
conditional expectation of lifetime utility as of time zero evaluated at {Ct , LFPt} and is denoted
by V0
V0 = E0
∞
∑
t=0
β tU (Ct ,LFPt) (1.48)
where at time 0 all state variables take the associated Ramsey-steady-state values. Let V RP0 and
V IP0 define the welfare levels associated with the Ramsey-optimal and strict inflation targeting
policies. If Θ be the welfare cost of adopting price stability policy instead of the Ramsey-optimal
policy conditional on a particular state in period 0, then a second order approximation of it around
the deterministic Ramsey steady state of the state vector yields
Θ≈ (V RPσεσε −V IPσεσε )(1−β ).
σ2ε
2
, (1.49)
where σε is a parameter scaling the standard deviation of the exogenous shocks. Θ measures, in
fact, the fraction of the Ramsey-optimal policy consumption process that a household would be
willing to give up to be as well off under price stability policy as under the Ramsey-optimal policy.
Table (1.5) reports welfare costs associated with strict inflation targeting, interpreted to be any
monetary policy capable of bringing about zero inflation at all times, for the baseline monetary
economy with labor taxes and the cashless economy with lump sum taxes for different values
of bargaining power ω , by keeping fixed the other structural parameters at their baseline values.
The point of comparison for the policy evaluation is the time-invariant stochastic real allocation
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associated with the Ramsey policy. The table reports conditional welfare cost as defined in eq.
(1.49).
Table 1.5: Welfare costs of price stability for different values of ω
ω monetary economy welfare cost (Θ×100) cashless economy welfare cost (Θ×100)
0.05 20.8366 0.3995
0.06 12.4711 0.3669
0.07 8.2319 0.3382
0.08 5.8063 0.3127
0.09 4.2883 0.2901
0.1 3.2764 0.2699
0.11 2.5698 0.2519
0.4 0.1173 0.0819
0.5 0.0794 0.0713
0.6 0.0629 0.0661
0.7 0.0552 0.0636
0.9 0.0500 0.0624
In table 5, (Θ×100) is defined as the percentage decrease in the Ramsey-optimal consumption
process necessary to make the level of welfare under the Ramsey policy identical to that under
the strict inflation targeting rule. The first row of table 5 shows the welfare cost consequences of
price stability for the baseline value of ω . It shows that the welfare cost of strict inflation targeting
for the monetary economy is huge. For the monetary economy it is about 21 percent and for the
cashless economy is about 0.4 percent of the consumption stream associated with the Ramsey
policy. These results imply that the welfare cost of price stability in the monetary economy is 50
times more than the welfare cost of price stability in the cashless economy once ω = 0.05. I then
do the same exercise for different and higher values of ω . As the next rows of the table show,
the welfare costs are monotonically decreasing in ω . By raising the bargaining share by only one
percentage point, the welfare cost of strict inflation targeting for the baseline model reduces by
more than 30%. Once the bargaining share is only 5% points higher and ω = 0.1, it decreases by
about 80% and is equal to 3.28. Although, the welfare cost for the case ω = 0.1 is significantly
lower than the case ω = 0.05 but still is very high compared to the welfare cost of price stability
for the same value of ω in the cashless economy. These findings demonstrate how the slope
of the welfare is extremely sensitive to the bargaining power of workers in the monetary model
in the presence of distorting taxes, specifically for the low values of the bargaining power. The
reason that the welfare cost of strict inflation targeting for the monetary economy is so high goes
back to the high desirability of the Ramsey planner to use inflation to minimize inefficiently high
static and intertemporal wedges fluctuations, when the bargaining share of workers is low. In the
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Figure 1.2: Degree of Worker’s Bargaining Power and the Welfare Costs of Price Stability
cashless economy, because the several intertemporal distortions present in the monetary economy
are absent, the cost of price stability is much lower.
To make it more clear, figure (1.2) illustrates the impact of raising the bargaining power ω on
the welfare costs of price stability in the baseline monetary model. Once ω is high enough the
model implies that the welfare costs of strict inflation targeting are negligible and close to zero.
Now, it is useful to relate my results on the welfare costs of strict inflation targeting in the
cashless economy to what Ravenna and Walsh (2012) report. They report welfare gains or losses
under parametrization which is either implying efficient labor matching in the sense of Hosios
(ω = κ = 0.5) or if not, the worker’s bargaining power is higher than the associated efficient
level. They find in several calibrated versions of their model that the level of welfare obtained
under the optimal policy is very close to the one obtained under a policy of price stability. Indeed,
I also find for high values of ω welfare cost is remarkably low and close to zero compared to
the low values of ω . But I also find that what is crucial for the size of welfare gains or losses
is how much low or high is the worker’s bargaining power not it is at the efficient level or not.
More precisely, in Ravenna and Walsh (2012) because they subsidize factor inputs to eliminate
the distortion introduced by monopolistic competition in product markets, when wages are Nash-
bargained and the Hosios efficiency condition holds the first best allocation or ’divine coincidence’
occurs. But since I do not follow this practice, automatically we are away from the first best and
unable to replicate it and so in the presence of inefficiency of wage setting in the spirit of Hosios,
the optimal way is to deal with both distortions simultaneously. In other words, the optimal way
to deal with a distortion depends on other existing distortions. Also since Ravenna and Walsh do
not report welfare costs for low values of bargaining power, one cannot know whether welfare
costs still remain negligible for that cases. Once I adopt their calibration of parameters and apply
it to my model for the case that they have report on relative optimal inflation volatility (the case
with Nash bargaining wages where ω = 0.7 in table 5 of their paper), I find an optimal inflation
volatility (about 0.05%) much lower than their report (0.22%) that implies a very low welfare
cost for inflation strict targeting policy. These similar results obtained despite the differences in
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Figure 1.3: Dynamic Path for the Baseline Monetary Economy with Matching Frictions in Response to a 1 Percent Positive Shock to Gt for
Three Different Values of ω .
the models frameworks and different solution methods and also the fact that Ravenna and Walsh
subsidize factor inputs and assume an efficient steady state.
1.7 Impulse Responses
In this section, I first study impulse responses of the baseline monetary economy to government
expenditures and TFP shocks for three different values of bargaining weight (0.05, 0.4 and 0.9),
and then for the case ω = 0.05, I compare the responses of the baseline model economy with
the responses of the cashless economy with lump-sum taxes and matching frictions. Specifically,
I first investigate the extent to which the introduction of matching frictions changes the Ramsey
allocation behavior, compared to the one arising in the standard New-Keynesian economy with
sticky prices and without real state contingent debt. In other words, I wish to find out whether
with labor market frictions the result that under sticky prices the Ramsey planner replaces front-
loading revenue via surprise changes in the price level with standard debt and tax instruments
and in response to an unexpected increase in government spending the planner does not generate
a surprise increase in the price level and instead prefers to finance the increase in expenditures
through an increase in taxes and public debt can be obtained.
Fig. (1.3) displays the impulse responses to a one-percent increase in government spending
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Figure 1.4: Dynamic Path for the Baseline Monetary Economy with Matching Frictions in Response to a 1 Percent Positive Shock to Zt for
Three Different Values of ω .
predicted by the baseline model. We see that, once the bargaining power is low, the model eco-
nomy has a significant response to the shock in comparison with the other two cases which the
economy response is very mild. The baseline model predictions about inflation, public debt and
taxes for the baseline value of bargaining power ω = 0.05 (shown with the cyan line) are in a
sharp contrast to the predictions of standard New-Keynesian model with Walrasian-based wages.
The shock leads to a substantial rise in inflation and labor taxes and a sharp drop in public debt in
this case. While the increase in labor tax is in line with the standard New-Keynesian framework,
but its inheritance of the stochastic process of the underlying exogenous shock is in contrast to
that framework, which predicts a unit root behavior in public debt and taxes. Despite the fact that
prices are sticky and changing them are costly, the government finds it optimal to increase the
price level which leads to a sharp decline in real public debt. The model also predicts a rise in out-
put, employment, the number of people searching for jobs and vacancies. Output and employment
responses are approximately the same and go in the same direction. The model also implies that,
consistent with the preceding analysis, by increasing ω the Ramsey planner doesn’t inflate away
because price increases are costly and instead finances its spending partly by increasing taxes and
partly by increasing public debt. Although it’s not very clear in the figure for the labor tax due to
the large response in the case ω = 0.05, but both taxes and the stock of public debt display per-
sistent increases and display random walk behavior for ω = 0.4, 0.9, consistent with the standard
result.
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Figure 1.5: Dynamic Path for the Baseline Monetary Economy and the Cashless Economy in Response to a 1 Percent Positive Shock to Gt
for ω = 0.05.
Fig. (1.4) displays the path of the economy in response to positive TFP shocks. Again, like
the response to the government spending shock, the responses of the case ω = 0.05 are very larger
than the responses of the cases ω = 0.4, 0.9. The increase in total factor productivity leads to an
increase in output and consumption that is greatly amplified for the case ω = 0.05. The shock
also induces a remarkable drop in inflation once the bargaining power is low. Due to the sharp
and large falls in taxes the real wages (not shown here) decrease substantially. Taken together
the decreases in inflation and real wages, unitary profits of firms increase and as a result firms
post more vacancies and employment increase for ω = 0.05 on impact. However this doesn’t
last and after a while due to the rise in inflation vacancy postings drop substantially and leads
to a significant decrease in employment and an increase in search activity. Compared to this
case, once the bargaining power rises, on the one hand the drop in inflation and the increases in
output and consumption are greatly mitigated. On the other hand, tax rates, vacancy postings and
employment increase. The response of public debt is also intuitive. for the case ω = 0.05 that the
drops in inflation and tax rates are high, the stock of public debt increases substantially on impact.
when the bargaining power rises and income taxes increase and the drop in inflation is mitigated,
then as a result the public debt decreases.
To ascertain the role played by the low bargaining power on the part of workers in the monetary
economy and in the presence of distorting taxes, Figures (1.5) and (1.6) display the responses of
the baseline economy without lump-sum taxes and the cashless economy with lump-sum taxes
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Figure 1.6: Dynamic Path for the Baseline Monetary Economy and the Cashless Economy in Response to a 1 Percent Positive Shock to Zt
for ω = 0.05.
to government expenditures and technology shocks for seven macro variables. First, we see that
the responses of the monetary model to both shocks are very significant and very larger than
the responses of the cashless economy. For example, in response to the government expenditure
shock, inflation jumps up sharply and has a strong response in the monetary economy, the response
of inflation in the cashless economy is much more limited and is approximately zero. This remains
also the case for the other macro variables.
In response to a positive technology shock (Figure 6), the cashless economy’s response, like
its response to the government expenditures shock, is much more smaller than the monetary eco-
nomy’s response to that shock, for all the interested macro variables. In particular, the negative
response of inflation is significantly smaller than the responses of the same variable in the case of
monetary economy. On the other hand, the responses of employment and vacancy postings to the
TFP shock in the both economies are very different and in contrast to each other. As I explained
before, after a while vacancy posting and employment fall below the steady state in the monetary
economy, but this is not the case in the cashless economy. Both variables rise on impact and do not
display any decrease relative to the their steady state values. The response of the fraction of search
workers in the cashless economy is much smaller than the monetary economy and also displays
a different manner. While the number of workers searching for a job jumps down on impact and
then converges to zero in the cashless economy, in the monetary economy, in contrast, it jumps up
on impact and then declines substantially and rises again above the steady state. Important to em-
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phasize is that, in response to the government spending shock, the fraction of searching workers
has a large positive response and then converges to zero in the cashless economy, while it jumps
up and then down and then converges to below zero in the monetary economy.
1.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the Ramsey-optimal policy in the context of a New Keynesian monetary
model with labor matching frictions. I jointly characterize optimal fiscal and monetary policy.
My main results are to demonstrate how the optimal policy calls for an extremely high inflation
rate that is highly volatile and how the welfare costs of price stability are huge once the worker’s
bargaining power is low and the government has no access to lump-sum taxes but only distortion-
ary taxes. The existing papers that study the optimal monetary policy in a DSGE model with labor
market frictions and in the presence of sticky prices limit their attention to the cashless economies
with lump-sum taxes, which are empirically unrealistic assumptions. In contrast, to study op-
timal monetary policy, I develop a general equilibrium matching model with sticky prices, money,
and distortionary labor income taxes, which is an extension of the DSGE matching and perfectly
competitive model of Arseneau and Chugh (2012).
I find that: first, the optimal policy implies an inflation rate that is extremely high and volatile
once the bargaining share of workers is low. Second, price stability for low values of bargaining
power is significantly harmful and the welfare costs in terms of consumption are very high. Third,
I find a clear trade-off between the optimal rate of inflation and its volatility and the optimal
income tax rate and its variations. While, in contrast to the standard New Keynesian literature and
the cashless models with matching frictions, for a small degree of price stickiness parameter, the
Ramsey-optimal policy, due to the presence of a cash-in-advance constraint on purchases of the
consumption good, calls for a high inflation rate that is very volatile. It, at the same time, calls
for a lower income tax rate that is significantly less volatile. Fourth, the results make it quite clear
that, it is the inflation that plays the main role in inducing efficient fluctuations in labor markets,
not taxes, despite the fact that prices are sticky and costly to change. Fifth, my results show that,
by increasing bargaining power the optimal rate of inflation and its volatility drop substantially,
such that once the bargaining power is set to 0.9, they fall to near zero. Sixth, with high values
for the bargaining power or in the absence of distorting taxes and the presence of lump-sum taxes,
my model confirms the standard results in the literature.
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Chapter 2
Monetary Policy Rules in a Frictional
Labor Market with Distortionary Taxes
2.1 Introduction
In this paper, I consider a general equilibrium search and matching model with sticky prices and
distorting labor income taxes that incorporates a labor force participation decision. I use this
model to show that, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, even in the presence of price adjust-
ment costs, inflation targeting is remarkably welfare detrimental and at the same time responding
to output or labor market tightness yields significantly lower welfare costs than just responding
to inflation. I analyze the policy implications of three simple monetary rules: an strict inflation
targeting rule, a rule that responds to output, and a rule that responds to labor market tightness,
with smoothing and no-smoothing nominal interest rates.
As a benchmark, I consider a model economy that is similar to the fully flexible price model
of Arseneau and Chugh (2012), where they consider a simple DSGE labor search and matching
model and calibrate it to the U.S. data in such a way that it generates business cycle fluctuations
for several key labor market outcomes very close to the empirical evidence. For Arseneau and
Chugh (2012) results, the bargaining parameter is very crucial. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)
proposed a new way to calibrate the parameters of the Mortensen-Pissarides model and found that
a reasonably calibrated model is consistent with the key business cycle facts. Two central para-
meters for their finding are the worker’s value of non-market activity and the worker’s bargaining
weight where the first one is substantially higher and the second one is substantially lower than
the values used in the standard parametrization of the Mortensen-Pissarides model. I adopt the
Arseneau and Chugh (2012) calibration for these two parameters where they relied on Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008) calibration. For the other search and matching parameters, I also adopt their
calibration. I depart from Arseneau and Chugh (2012) by assuming an imperfectly competitive
monetary economy where price are sticky a la Rotemberg (1982) and by introducing money into
the model via a cash-in-advance constraint on consumption goods. I also, in order to make my
model comparable to the vast literature on the joint determination of fiscal and monetary policy in
New Keynesian frameworks, assume that debt is non-contingent nominal debt. Because I want to
consider firms that are price setters, I assume that final consumption is a composite good, aggreg-
ated over a continuum of goods with the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. Each good is produced by a
monopolist, and all producers share the same labor-only linear technology. In the model, business
cycles are driven by stochastic variations in the level of government expenditures and total factor
productivity.
First, I compute the welfare losses of strict inflation targeting rule and a rule that responds to
output in the absence of labor market frictions. In the existing literature there are two key results
on the welfare costs of monetary policy rules in the context of the New Keynesian paradigm with
and without frictional labor markets. First, strict inflation targeting delivers a welfare level that
is virtually identical to the one obtained under the Ramsey-optimal policy. Second, response to
output is always welfare detrimental. For example, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) evaluate the
stabilizing properties of simple monetary and fiscal rules in a calibrated Walrasian-based model
of the business cycle with sticky prices, money and distortionary taxes. They find that welfare is
virtually insensitive to changes in the inflation coefficient and responding to output is significantly
harmful. Faia (2008) confirms these results in the context of the Canonical New Keynesian model
but with matching frictions. In her model the government has access to lump-sum taxes and the
bargaining weight is at the Hosios efficiency level. To quantify the differences in the level of
welfare under the Ramsey-optimal policy and under the monetary rules, I compute the welfare
costs of the monetary rules relative to the time-invariant equilibrium process associated with the
Ramsey policy using the methodology of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007). Once I compute the
welfare costs of strict inflation targeting and response to output rules in the absence of matching
frictions, I find the same results as Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, such that the welfare cost of strict
inflation targeting is virtually zero while responding to output is welfare detrimental. Like them,
I show that the welfare costs increase with varying output coefficient.
Then, I move to the frictional labor market model and I show that how the results dramatically
change. For the baseline calibration, my numerical findings suggest that strict inflation targeting
is significantly harmful once the bargaining parameter is low. On the other hand, responding to
labor market tightness or output can be considerably welfare improving compared to responding
only to inflation. This is specifically the case for the market tightness targeting. The welfare costs
associated with the rule that responds to the labor market tightness are more than 95% lower than
the welfare costs associated with the strict inflation targeting rule. I also show that for low values
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of the bargaining parameter the welfare costs associated with the simple Taylor rule, the rule
that responds to both inflation and output, can substantially be reduced by increasing the output
coefficient. This result is striking and in a sharp contrast to the existing literature which implies the
interest-rate rules that feature a positive response to output can lead to significant welfare losses, in
contrast to the strict inflation targeting rule that features virtually the same welfare as the optimal
monetary policy. However, the standard result emerges once we set the bargaining weight at the
Hosios level or higher. Indeed, by raising the worker’s bargaining weight, the optimal inflation
volatility and thus the welfare losses of strict inflation targeting remarkably decline and response
to output is no longer welfare improving relative to price stability rule. My numerical results also
suggest that the welfare losses of responding to output or labor market tightness are substantially
smaller without interest rate smoothing than with interest rate smoothing. This is specifically the
case for the response to output rule.
What explains these results? To answer this question, it is useful to relate my findings to
the findings of Arseneau and Chugh (2012). In their framework, Arseneau and Chugh (2012)
find that Ramsey government uses volatility of labor income tax rates to achieve smooth static
wedge and zero intertemporal distortions in order to induce efficient fluctuations in labor markets.
As they explained and showed carefully, while like the standard Ramsey models with Walrasian
labor market the goal of Ramsey planner is to smooth wedges, the nature of wage determina-
tion in a model of labor market frictions and whether they are set efficiently or not determine the
very nature of wedges and how they map into taxes. Once the Hosios condition is not met and
unemployment transfers are different from zero, they find that the optimal policy features high
volatility in both income tax and vacancy subsidy rates in order to keep the volatility of both static
and intertemporal distortions low. In the present framework which in contrast to the Arseneau
and Chugh (2012) framework is a monetary framework, it is the inflation rate and its variability
that play the crucial roles, more crucial than the role of labor taxes, in inducing efficient fluctu-
ations in static and intertemporal wedges, notwithstanding the fact that price adjustment is costly.
More precisely, once the worker’s bargaining power is inefficiently low, static and intertemporal
distortions are very volatile and since the main concern of the Ramsey government is to minimize
these distortions as much as possible over time, it uses suitable combinations of time varying infla-
tion, nominal interest and income tax rates along with an extremely high inflation rate to achieve
this aim. However, the quantitative results make it quite clear that the main burden of inducing
smooth intertemporal wedges over the business cycle falls on the inflation rate and its volatility.
Such a result- a substantially high inflation rate which is extremely volatile- is more stark when
we recall that price stability appears as the central goal of optimal monetary policy even in the
medium-scale macroeconomic models that feature a rich array of real and nominal rigidities, as
for example shown by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005b,a).
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Therefore, with a low value for bargaining power on the part of workers if the monetary au-
thority follows the strict inflation targeting, it in fact sets the inflation rate and its variability at
zero which produces substantial volatility in static and intertemporal wedges and labor market
tightness and, therefore, large and inefficient fluctuations in labor market. By responding to labor
market tightness or output along with inflation, inflation variability which is required to minimize
inefficient distortions is not anymore zero, although substantially higher than the optimal level,
and so welfare losses associated with these rules appear to be smaller than the strict inflation tar-
geting rule. Remarkably, increasing the output coefficient implies lower welfare losses, because it
significantly induces lower fluctuations in the wedges and labor market tightness.
When I follow the standard practice in the New Keynesian literature on optimal policy in
frictional labor markets models and ignore government financing issues, due to the presence of
lump-sum taxation, the results dramatically change. The welfare costs associated with the strict
inflation targeting rule, for the same structural parameters from the fiscal-policy model, drop by
about 99 percent and responding to output or labor market tightness doesn’t anymore imply lower
welfare losses. In fact, a positive response of the nominal interest rate to labor market tightness
leads to significantly larger welfare losses than a positive response to inflation, even once the
bargaining power is low. At the same time the welfare costs of responding to output are mono-
tonically increasing in output coefficient, thereby underlining the importance of not responding to
output. These results suggest that it is, in fact, the combination of both the low bargaining power
on the part of workers and the presence of distortionary labor income taxes that derives the main
findings presented in the paper.
Toward the end, I compare the impulse response functions under the Ramsey policy with the
impulse response functions implied by the standard New Keynesian model (the baseline model
without labor frictions), that is widely studied in the existing literature.1I show that how vastly
different the dynamics of the model with matching frictions are from the dynamics of the model
without matching frictions, once worker’s bargaining weight is low enough. By raising worker’s
bargaining power to the Hosios efficiency level and higher, the dynamics of the two models be-
come relatively similar.
One of the key findings in the literature on Ramsey-optimal policy in the presence of sticky
prices and absence of labor market frictions is that because changing prices are costly, on the one
hand, the optimal policy features price stability and on the other hand, tax rates and the real value
of government debt exhibit a near random walk behavior in response to a positive fiscal shock. I
show that in the frictional labor market model these are not the case when the bargaining parameter
1While there is a very large literature on the Canonical New Keynesian model with frictional labor markets, there
has been no paper, to the best of my knowledge, that study fiscal and monetary policy jointly in a model with labor
market frictions, sticky prices and distortionary taxes.
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is set at a small value. Indeed, surprise changes in the price level are optimal in this case and due
to these surprises real public debt declines on impact. More precisely, not only inflation jumps up
on impact but also it exhibits a near random walk behavior. With increasing the bargaining weight
we get similar results to the standard New Keynesian literature.
My work is more broadly related to the literature exploring the consequence of nominal ri-
gidities in models with frictional labor markets.2 The study most closely related to mine is Faia
(2008). However the focus of her paper differs from mine in a number of dimensions. First, Faia
considers a framework with lump-sum taxes and real wage rigidities, while in my framework real
wages are flexible and the presence of distortionary income taxes is very important for the welfare
costs of monetary rules and for the optimal policy implications. Second, she limits her attention
to the cases where the Hosios (1990) efficiency condition is met, while the worker’s bargaining
power and the implications of different values for it are crucial for my results. Third, in terms of
policy evaluations, Faia point of comparison is the optimal rule, whilst I follow Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2007) and consider Ramsey-optimal policy as the point of comparison. Fourth, my
search and matching model incorporates a labor force participation decision, while Faia (2008)
model is abstract from this and also the stock of employment is not an object of the preferences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic search model. In
Section 3, I define the Ramsey equilibrium and Section 4 presents the calibration of the model.
Section 5 studies the Ramsey optimal policy and computes the welfare costs of different monetary
regimes in the absence and presence of search and matching frictions. Section 6 analyzes Ramsey
optimal impulse responses of the model with and without frictional labor markets. Section 7
concludes.
2.2 Model Setup
The labor market frictions of the model economy are based on the DSGE labor search and match-
ing model of Arseneau and Chugh (2012). However, in contrast to their model which is a real
economy, I consider a monetary economy that allows for imperfect competitions and nominal ri-
gidities. More specifically, I add nominal rigidities in the form of price stickiness, a demand for
money by households originated in a cash-in-advance constraint, and assume that the government
issues nominal non-state contingent bonds instead of real state contingent bonds. The purpose of
these assumptions is to make the framework comparable to the New Keynesian models with and
without labor market frictions that focus on Ramsey-optimal policy. The matching frictional part
of the model features agents in three labor market states. They are either employed, searching for
2For example, Chéron and Langot (2000), Walsh (2003); Thomas (2008); Ravenna and Walsh (2011, 2012);
Blanchard and Gali (2010) among many others.
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a job or are outside of the labor force and enjoy their leisure.
2.2.1 Preferences
The economy is populated by a continuum (measure one) of individuals with identical preferences
represented by the discounted sum of utility over consumption Ct , search activity St , and the
desired stock of employment Nct ,
E0
∞
∑
t=0
β tU (Ct ,St ,Nct ) (2.1)
with
U (Ct ,St ,Nct ) = u(Ct)−H [(1− ppt)St +Nct ] , (2.2)
and
Ct =
[ˆ 1
0
c
ξ−1
ξ
it
] ξ
ξ−1
, (2.3)
where β < 1. u(.) is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function in consumption Ct that is
assumed to be a composite good produced with a continuum of private consumption , cit , of variety
i ∈ [0, 1], defined by Eq. (2.3). ξ > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
The money demand for households is introduced in the form of a cash-in-advance constraint
as follows
APtCt ≤Mht , (2.4)
Optimal demand for each variety i takes the familiar form:
cit
Ct
=
(
pit
Pt
)−ξ
, (2.5)
where it has been obtained by minimizing total expenditure,
´ 1
0 pitcitdi, subject to the aggregate
constraint (2.3). pit is the nominal price of a good of variety i at time t and Pt =
[´ 1
0 p
1−ξ
it
] 1
1−ξ is
the nominal price index for final goods.
H(.) is a strictly increasing and strictly convex function in (1− ppt)St +Nct which is defined
below. Here ppt represents the probability of job-finding by households that is given from their
point of view. Suppose that ρ denotes a constant separation rate at which the employment rela-
tionships that were active in period t−1, Nct−1, experience separations. A fraction of these newly
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unemployed household members enters the job search process at time t. Thus St , the fraction of
searching workers, is the sum of this fraction and the fraction of household members that were
nonparticipants in the labor market in period t− 1, but are participants in period t. I now define
the measured labor force in period LFPt as
LFPt = Nct +(1− ppt)St , (2.6)
In each period t, LFPt members participate in the labor force and 1−LFPt do not participate.
In this definition, (1− ppt)St represents the measure of individuals who turn out to be unsuccess-
ful in finding a job. The fraction of household members who are employed, Nct is also defined
as
Nct = (1−ρ)Nct−1+St ppt , (2.7)
this equation implies that current hires become productive in the same period. This timing
is consistent with the bulk of the business cycle literature, where employment is assumed to be
a non-predetermined variable and is assumed in Blanchard and Gali (2010) and Arseneau and
Chugh (2012) among some others.
The household is assumed to face a sequence of budget constraints given by
PtCt +Bt+1+Mt = Pt (1− τt)WtNct +Rt−1Bt +Mt−1+(1− ppt)Stχ+Πt , t > 0 (2.8)
where Rt denotes the gross one-period nominal interest rate, Wt is the real wage, τt denotes the
income tax rate, Bt+1 represent risk-free nominal bonds that the representative household holds
and Mt is cash balances . χ is the level of unemployment benefits andΠt is a lump-sum component
of income that include, among other items, dividends from ownership of firms or lump-sum taxes.
Eq. (2.8) is supplemented with a solvency condition which prevents the household from engaging
in Ponzi schemes.
Associate the Lagrange multipliers
{
λt
Pt
}
with the sequence of budget constraints and {µt}
with the sequence of perceived laws of motion for the measure of family members who are em-
ployed, Eq. (2.7). The household’s first-order conditions that maximize utility (2.1) subject to the
mentioned constraints with respect to the aggregates Ct , Bt+1, Mt , St and Nct are
u
′
(Ct) = λt
[
1+A
(
1−R−1t
)]
(2.9)
λt
Pt
= βRt
λt+1
Pt+1
, (2.10)
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λt (1− ppt)χ+µt ppt = (1− ppt)H ′ [(1− ppt)St +Nct ] , (2.11)
λt (1− τt)Wt +β (1−ρ)Etµt+1 = µt +H ′ [(1− ppt)St +Nct ] . (2.12)
Eq. (2.9) denotes that the equality between the marginal utility of consumption and the mar-
ginal utility of wealth is distorted by the presence of the money demand, and Eq. (2.10) represents
the standard pricing equation for nominal bonds.
Solve Eq. (2.11) for µt
µt =
(
1− ppt
ppt
)[
H
′ [
(1− ppt)St +Hht
]
−λtχ
]
. (2.13)
Now from merging Eqs. (2.11) and (2.12) by eliminating µt we get
H
′
(LFPt)−χλt
pptλt = (1− τt)Wt−χ+
β (1−ρ)
λt Et
{(
1−ppt+1
ppt+1
)[
H
′
(LFPt+1)−χλt+1
]}
,
(2.14)
where I used the definition LFPt = Nct +(1− ppt)St . Eq. (2.14) gives the optimal labor force
participation condition for households. This participation condition asserts that, the fraction of
agents searching for jobs is determined in such a way that at the optimum, the expected payoff of
searching will be equal to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and participation.
2.2.2 Government and Monetary Policy
The government imposes distortionary income taxes at rate τt , issues one-period nominally risk-
free bonds, Bt , and prints money, Mt , to finance a stream of spending, Gt , that is exogenous,
stochastic and unproductive. The government is also assumed to pay unemployment benefits,
(1− ppt)Stχ , to households. The period t government budget constraint is
PtτtWtNct +Bt +Mt = Mt−1+Rt−1Bt−1+PtGt +(1− ppt)PtStχ, (2.15)
Let At ≡ Mt−1+Rt−1Bt−1Pt−1 denote total real government liabilities outstanding at the end of period
t−1 in units of period t−1 goods.
I assume that the logarithm of variable Gt follows a first-order autoregressive process of the
form
lnGt = (1−ρg) lnG+ρglnGt−1+ εgt , (2.16)
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where ρg ∈ (−1,1) and G > 0 are parameters, and εgt is an i.i.d. innovation with mean zero
and standard deviation σg. The parameter G represents the non-stochastic steady-state level of
government expenditures.
I also assume that the monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate according to the fol-
lowing rule
ln(
Rt
R∗
) = αRln
(
Rt
R∗
)
+αpi ln
( pit
pi∗
)
+αY ln
(
Yt
Y ∗
)
+αQln
(
Qt
Q∗
)
(2.17)
where Y ∗ represents the non-stochastic Ramsey steady-state level of output, and R∗, pi∗, Q∗,
αR, αpi , αY and αQ are parameters. Here, Qt denotes labor market tightness. I consider the
following monetary rules. (1) a rule that responds to inflation only, strict inflation targeting, αpi =
1.5, αR = 0, αQ = 0 and αY = 0, (2) a rule with interest-rate smoothing that responds to output
such that αpi = 1.5, αY = 0.5/4, αQ = 0 and αR = 0.8, (3) a rule with interest-rate smoothing that
responds to labor market tightness such that αpi = 1.5, αY = 0, αQ = 0.5/4 and αR = 0.8. (4) I also
consider the cases without interest rate smoothing αR = 0. These are very common parameters in
the literature. Considering a monetary rule with response to labor market tightness is motivated
by the fact that it is a summary statistic of period t labor market outcomes in general equilibrium
matching models, as emphasized by Arseneau and Chugh (2012). Recall that the labor income tax
rate τt is determined optimally in the model when policy is set via any of these simple monetary
rules.
2.2.3 Production
The production side of the economy features firms that sell their product in a monopolistic com-
petitive market and in order to hire workers they go to a matching market. Hiring workers is
costly such that when firm i posts ϑit vacancies, it costs γ per-vacancy posting. The labor mar-
ket mechanism is the same as the Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model where wages
of all workers, whether newly hired or not, are set in period-by period Nash negotiations. The
wage-setting protocol is taken as given when firms maximize profits.
Each good’s variety i ∈ [0, 1] is produced by a monopolist that faces quadratic costs of adjust-
ing prices and uses only labor as an input. The monopolist also faces a constant elasticity demand
function
yit =
(
pit
Pt
)−ξ
Yt , (2.18)
obtained from the demand functions for the private goods (2.5) where Yt = ZtN
f
t .
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Following Arseneau and Chugh (2012) I assume that each firm i begins period t with employ-
ment stock N ft−1 and the productive employment stock of such a firm in period t, N
f
t , depends on
its vacancy postings at that period and the random matching process. Let qqt denotes the probab-
ility that a given vacancy is filled by a worker which is taken as given by the firm. This probability
like the matching probability for households, ppt , is assumed to be dependent only on aggregate
labor market conditions.
The representative firm discounts profits of period-t using β t λtλ0 , which is the value to the
households of receiving profits, and chooses
{
pit , N
f
it , ϑit
}
to solve the following maximization
problem in real terms:
Max Πit = E0
∞
∑
t=0
β t
λt
λ0
 pitPt yit−WtN fit − γϑit− ϕ2
(
pit
pit−1
−1
)2
ZtN
f
it
 , (2.19)
where pit ≡ PtPt−1 denotes the gross consumer price inflation rate,
θ
2
(
pit
pit−1
−1
)
ZtN
f
it represents
price adjustment costs, pti is the price of good’s variety i, θ measures the degree of price stickiness
and γϑit represents costs of posted vacancies.
The maximization problem is subject to yit = cit that must satisfy the demand function (2.18)
and the following sequence of perceived laws of motion for employment level
N fit = (1−ρ)N fi,t−1+qqtϑit . (2.20)
Let the Lagrange multiplier on the production constraint (2.18) be MCt , which is, in fact, the
marginal cost of the representative firm.
As is common in the literature, I restrict attention to symmetric equilibria where all firms
charge the same price for the goods they produce. As a result pit = Pt for all t. But if they all
choose the same price, they face exactly the same demand. This in turn means that they will all
produce the same amount and will hire an equal amount of labor (since they all face the same
aggregate TFP). So I drop the index i. Then the first-order conditions of the above maximization
problem yields the following equations
γ
qqt
= ZtMCt−Wt +β (1−ρ)Et λt+1λt
γ
qqt+1
, (2.21)
1−θpit (pit−1)+βEt
(
λt+1
λt
)[
θpit+1 (pit+1−1)Yt+1Yt
]
= (1−MCt)ξ , (2.22)
Equation (2.21) is job creation condition that is an arbitrage condition for posting of new
vacancies. The left side is the search costs associated with hiring
(
γ
qqt
)
. The right side is the
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discounted expected value of profits from a match. Equation (2.22) is the well-known expectations
augmented Phillips curve.
2.2.4 Nash-Bargained Wages
Following much of the literature I assume that wages are determined through Nash bargaining.
Like Arseneau and Chugh (2012), let define V
(
Nct−1
)
as the value function associated with the
household problem. Then envelope condition by using Eq. (2.13) gives
V
′ (
Nct−1
)
= (1−ρ)µt
= (1−ρ)
(
1−ppt
ppt
)[
H
′
(LFPt)−χλt
]
.
(2.23)
Let V Et denotes the value of an employed member to a household. This value is defined after
labor matching has taken place and so the labor market status of each member’s measured is
known in period t. Let also define VUt as the value of an unemployed member to a household.
This value is defined before labor matching takes place. Thus, in contrast to the former case, the
participation decisions of household about how many members to be sent to search for jobs occur
before matching has taken place. 3
For a member who is employed, the valuation equation for being in a match that produces in
period t is
V Et = (1− τt)Wt +
β
λt
Et
(
λt+1
V
′
(Nct )
λt
)
, (2.24)
the first term on the right hand side of Eq. (2.24) denotes real wages net of taxes and the second
term which is based on envelope condition (2.23), stands for the marginal value of entering period
t +1 with another preexisting employment relationship. The value of an unsuccessful member in
finding a job is given in turn by
VUt = χ.
Because a household re-optimizes participation at the beginning of period t + 1 and at this time
(1− ppt)St is not a state variable, there is zero continuation payoff of an unemployed member to
the household. It follows that the household’s surplus from an employment can be written as
V Et −VUt = (1− τt)Wt−χ+ β (1−ρ)λt
∗Et
{
λt+1 (1− ppt+1) H
′
(LFPt+1)−χλt+1
ppt+1λt+1
}
, (2.25)
3For a precise image of the timing of events see page 932 of Arseneau and Chugh (2012).
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where I used Eq. (2.23) to get rid of V
′
(Nct ). Comparing Eqs. (2.25) and (2.14) reveals that
V Et −VUt =
H
′
(LFPt)−χλt
pptλt
, (2.26)
update this expression one period and substitute it in Eq. (2.25)
V Et −VUt =Wt−χ+ β (1−ρ)λt
∗Et
{
λt+1 (1− ppt+1)
(
V Et+1−VUt+1
)} , (2.27)
Note also that the firm’s surplus from an established employment relationship, denoted by ϒt ,
is given by
ϒt = ZtMCt−Wt + β (1−ρ)λt Et (λt+1ϒt+1) , (2.28)
where ϒt = γqqt .
The probabilities qqt and ppt depend on a constant return to scale matching function which
converts unemployed workers S and vacancies ϑ into matches, m:
m(St ,ϑt) = ζSκt ϑ
1−κ
t , (2.29)
Here St and ϑt denote aggregate variables, because I assume that we are in equilibrium. Define
Qt = ϑtSt as the market tightness at time t. The probability for an unemployed worker to be matched
with a vacancy equals ppt = ζQ1−κt and the probability for a vacancy to be filled equals qqt =
ζQ−κt .
Because of the equilibrium Nt = N
f
t = Nht , hence the aggregate employment is given by
Nt = (1−ρ)Nt−1+m(St ,ϑt) . (2.30)
Let denotes by ω ∈ (0,1) the worker’s bargaining power. Naturally, the firm’s bargaining
power will be 1−ω . Under Nash bargaining, workers and firms choose Wt to maximize
(
V Et −VUt
)ω ϒ1−ωt .
This maximization problem implies the following sharing rule
V Et −VUt
ϒt
=
ω
1−ω (1− τt) , (2.31)
Now by using Eqs. (2.21), (2.27) and (2.31) we get the following wage equation
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Wt = ωZtMCt + (1−ω)(1−τt)χ+βω (1−ρ)
∗{λt+1λt
γ
qqt+1
[1− (1− ppt+1) (1−τt+1)(1−τt) ]}
(2.32)
The first two terms of the Nash-bargained wage equation show that part of the period t wage
payment is a convex combination of the contemporaneous values to the firm and the household,
given by the marginal product of a new employee ZtMCt and the value of unemployment be-
nefits (1−ω)(1−τt)χ , respectively. The last term of Eq. (2.32) captures the forward-looking aspect of
employment, whose value is also capitalized in the period t wage payment.
2.3 Equilibrium and the Ramsey Problem
A stationary competitive equilibrium in this economy, given A−1, the fixed parameter χ and exo-
genous stochastic processes {Gt , Zt}∞t=0 is a set of endogenous processes
{Ct , Ht , St , Bt ,Wt , Rt , ϑt , Pt , At , Mt , τt , λt , MCt}∞t=0
for t = 0,1, ... that remain bounded in some neighborhood around the deterministic steady-
state and satisfy equations (2.10), (2.14), (2.15), (2.21), (2.22), (2.32), the aggregate resource
constraint
Yt =Ct +Gt +
θ
2
(pit−1)2Yt + γϑt , (2.33)
and the total aggregate nominal balances constraint Mt = PtCt .
The problem of the Ramsey planner is to raise revenue to finance exogenous government ex-
penditures through labor income taxes, money creation, and issuance of one-period nominally
risk-free government debt in such a way that maximizes the welfare of the representative house-
hold Eq. (2.1), subject to the equilibrium conditions of the economy. Put another way, the optimal
fiscal and monetary policy is the process {τt , Rt}∞t=0 associated with the competitive equilibrium
that yields the highest level of utility to the representative household.
2.4 Calibration
I take a period to be a quarter. The structural parameter values implied by the calibration are
summarized in table (2.1) . I adopt logarithmic utilities
u(Ct) = lnCt and N (LFPt) =
υ
1+1/φ
LFP1+1/φt , (2.34)
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where I set υ = 5.5 and φ = 1, which are very common values in the literature. The discount
factor is set to be β = 0.99 that is also a common value. Following Basu and Fernald (1997), I
assume that the value added mark-up of prices over marginal cost is equal to 0.25.
To calibrate the degree of price stickiness, I follow Chugh (2006) and derive the mapping
between the parameter θ in the Rotemberg quadratic price adjustment cost and the probability f
of receiving a signal to change prices in the price-stickiness of Calvo apparatus. This mapping
delivers the following relationship between θ and f
θ =
1− f
f
1
1−β (1− f ) ,
If we assume that the average duration of a price is four quarters, then we get a value for
f equal to 14 . Therefore, in the present model which is a quarterly model since β = 0.99, the
corresponding Rotemberg parameter is thus θ = 13.5. Chugh (2006) sets this value equal to
5.88 because he assumes that on average 1/3 of firms set price in a given period. I set A = 1
which implies that households hold money balances equivalent to 100 percent of their quarterly
consumption.
I take the calibration of all of the matching parameters from Arseneau and Chugh (2012).
The bargaining parameter, ω , the unemployment benefits χ , the exogenous separation rate ρ
and vacancy elasticity of matches 1− κ are set to 0.05, 0.76, 0.1 and 0.6, respectively. I set
the values of matching rate for a searching individual ppt , the fixed cost of opening a vacancy
γ , and the job-filling rate of a vacancy qqt and the matching parameter ζ equal to ppt = 0.61,
γ = 0.27, qqt = 0.9, ζ = 0.77. The fraction of searching workers St in the steady-state is set to
0.09. I set the persistence parameters and the standard deviations of the exogenous processes of
the government expenditure shock and the productivity shock such that
(
ρg, εgt
)
= (0.97, 0.027)
and (ρz, εzt ) = (0.95, 0.006) following Arseneau and Chugh (2012). Following Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2007), I choose G to be 17% of output.
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Table 2.1: Baseline Calibration
Calibrated Parameters Value
β Discount factor 0.99
θ Price stickiness parameter 13.5
ξ The value added mark-up of prices 0.25
υ Preference Parameter 5.5
A Fraction of consumption held in money 1
φ Elasticity of participation w.r.t wages 1
z Steady state productivity shock 1
ρg Serial correlation of lngt 0.97
σ z Std. dev of innovation to lnzt 0.006
σg Std. dev of innovation to lngt 0.027
ρz Serial correlation of lnzt 0.95
γ Fixed cost of posting vacancy 0.27
ζ Matching function parameter 0.77
ω Worker’s bargaining power 0.05
χ Unemployment benefits 0.76
κ Elasticity of aggregate matches 0.4
ρ Job separation rate 0.1
2.5 Ramsey-optimal policy and Welfare Measuring
To study the business-cycle properties of Ramsey-optimality policy I approximate the Ramsey
equilibrium dynamics by solving a second-order approximation to the Ramsey equilibrium con-
ditions around the non-stochastic steady-state of these conditions. My numerical method is the
perturbation algorithm described by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) which has been implemen-
ted by them for example in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007, 2004b, 2005b). In computing the
sample moments of interested variables, all structural parameters of the model take the values
shown in table 1. Second moments are calculated using Monte Carlo simulations. I conduct 1000
simulations, each 200 periods long. For each simulation, I compute sample moments and then
average these figures over the 1000 simulations.
To measure the welfare costs of the simple monetary rules discussed above, as I mentioned
in the introduction, I follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007, 2005b) and use their procedure to
conduct policy evaluations by computing the welfare cost of a particular monetary/fiscal policy
regime relative to the time-invariant equilibrium process associated with the Ramsey policy. I
estimate the welfare conditional on a particular state in period 0 where all state variables of the
economy equal their respective Ramsey-steady-state values and all policy regimes have the same
steady state. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) find that conducting policy evaluations conditional
on an initial state different from the Ramsey steady state deliver similar results. Let the Ramsey-
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optimal policy and the alternative policy be denoted by RP and X , respectively. Let also the
equilibrium processes for consumption and labor force participation associated with a particular
policy be {Ct , LFPt} . The conditional welfare related to the time-invariant equilibrium implied
by the Ramsey-optimal policy evaluated at {Ct , LFPt} is denoted by V RP0 and is defined as
V RP0 = E0
∞
∑
t=0
β tU
(
CRPt ,LFPt
)
(2.35)
The conditional welfare related to policy regime X is denoted by V X0 and is defined as
V X0 = E0
∞
∑
t=0
β tU
(
CXt ,LFPt
)
(2.36)
Let Θ be the welfare cost of adopting policy X instead of the Ramsey-optimal policy. Θ
measures, in fact, the fraction of the Ramsey-optimal policy consumption process that a household
would be willing to give up to be as well off under price stability policy as under the Ramsey-
optimal policy. More precisely,
V X0 = E0
∞
∑
t=0
β tU
(
(1−Θc)CRPt ,LFPt
)
(2.37)
By using the utility forms defined in Eq. (2.34) and then a second order approximation of the
obtained Θc around the deterministic Ramsey steady state of the state vector yields
Θ≈ (V RPσεσε (x, 0)−V Xσεσε (x, 0))(1−β ).
σ2ε
2
, (2.38)
where V RPσεσε and V
X
σεσε represent the welfare costs of Ramsey-optimal policy and policy X
conditional on initial state vector x and σε is a parameter scaling the standard deviation of the
exogenous shocks. In fact Eq. (2.38) has been obtained by totally differentiating Θ obtained from
Eq. (2.37) twice with respect to σε and evaluated at (x0, σε) = (x, 0) .
2.5.1 The Model without Search and Matching Frictions
Before turning to the welfare implications of the monetary policy rules in the baseline model, I
compute welfare losses of strict inflation targeting and response to output rules for the case of
Walrasian labor markets, which is in fact the Canonical New Keynesian model with distortionary
income taxes and a distorted steady-state. This model is similar to the model considered by
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007). Table (2.2) reports welfare costs Θ of those rules once the point
of comparison for the policy evaluations is the time-invariant stochastic real allocation under the
Ramsey policy. The first row of the table shows that the welfare cost of strict inflation targeting is
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only 0.0078% of consumption per period. The second and the next rows of table (2.2) display the
welfare consequences of a Taylor rule policy for different levels of output coefficient. The rows
show that how welfare losses are monotonically increasing in αY . Figure (2.1) illustrates this very
positive relation between welfare costs and responding to output more clearly. This figure is very
similar to what Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) report, where interest-rate rules that respond to
output can be harmful (Panel (b) of Fig. 1 in their paper).
Table 2.2: Welfare Comparison of Alternative Monetary Policy Rules-Walrasian Labor Markets
Model
Monetary policy rules αpi αY welfare cost
(Θ×100)
Inflation targeting 1.5 0 0.0078
Inflation and output responses 1.5 0.1 0.0213
1.5 0.2 0.0411
1.5 0.3 0.0664
1.5 0.4 0.095
1.5 0.5 0.1257
1.5 0.6 0.1576
1.5 0.7 0.19
1.5 0.8 0.2224
1.5 0.9 0.2544
1.5 1 0.286
2.5.2 Frictional Labor Markets Model
I now turn to the policy evaluations for the economy with search and matching frictions. The
policy evaluations have done for the monetary rules presented above in Subsection 2.2. Table
(2.3) summarizes the main properties of the policies under different values for worker’s bargaining
weight. In this table σpi stands for the standard deviation of inflation, σSW and σIW stand for
the standard deviations of static wedge and intertemporal wedge, respectively, which are defined
below in Eqs. (2.41) and (2.42). σQ and στ are the standard deviations of labor market tightness
and labor income tax rates, respectively. The first row of table shows that in contrast to the case
of Walrasian labor markets (table 2) the welfare losses associated with strict inflation targeting
appear to be extremely large relative to the optimal policy once the worker’s bargaining power is
low and equal to the baseline calibration ω = 0.05. Interestingly, the rules that respond to output
or labor market tightness with interest rate smoothing or no-smoothing imply non-negligible lower
welfare losses in comparison with strict inflation targeting. This is significantly the case for the
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Figure 2.1: The Canonical New Keynesian Economy: the Welfare Costs of Responding to Output
labor market tightness targeting rule. Specifically, taking the difference between the welfare losses
associated with the strict inflation targeting rule reveals that agents have to give up more than
23.8%, that is, more than 23.8 of one percent, of their consumption stream under the price stability
rule to be as well off as under the Ramsey-optimal policy. This cost for the response to output rule
with interest rate smoothing and without smoothing is about 9.65 and 3.43 percent, respectively.
In the case of the rule that targets labor market tightness, the welfare costs remarkably drop to just
1% of the consumption stream.
Figure (2.2) displays another significant result of the present paper which is in a sharp contrast
to the existing literature. It illustrates the impacts of increasing the output coefficient αY on
welfare costs, in the absence of interest rate smoothing, while keeping the inflation coefficient of
the monetary rule and the bargaining power at αpi = 1.5 and ω = 0.05, respectively. Figure (2.2)
shows that, in a clear contrast to the figure (2.1), the welfare costs of the simple Taylor rule are
monotonically decreasing in αY ∈ [0, 1.2]. When, for example, αY = 1, the welfare loss of the rule
that responds to output is over 22% lower than the welfare loss associated with the strict inflation
targeting rule.
Furthermore, the results suggest that while the welfare costs associated with the rule that
responds to the labor market tightness, with and without interest-rate smoothing, are virtually
identical to one another, the welfare costs associated with the rule that responds to the output and
with interest-rate smoothing are significantly higher than the welfare costs of without interest-rate
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smoothing case.
Table 2.3: Welfare Comparison of Alternative Monetary Policy Rules-Frictional Labor Markets
Model
Worker’s bargaining power Monetary policy rules αpi αY αq αR welfare cost σpi σSW σIW σQ στ
(Θ×100)
ω = 0.05
Strict inflation targeting 1.5 0 0 23.8419 0 189.18 54.5 186.2 12.5
Output response-with smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0.8 9.6476 4.7 115.6 33.3 113.8 7.55
Output response-no smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0 3.4293 7.9 63.8 18.3 62.7 4.3
Market tightness response-with smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0.8 1.0742 10.7 17.9 5.2 17.6 1.6
Market tightness response-no smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0 0.9863 11.4 7.3 2.1 7.2 1.5
ω = 0.1
Strict inflation targeting 1.5 0 0 4.5922 0 97.9 28.2 96.4 7.4
Output response-with smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0.8 2.4152 3.05 70.06 20.2 68.9 5.3
Output response-no smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0 1.1255 5.9 43.7 12.6 43.03 3.5
Market tightness response-with smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0.8 0.5357 8.8 15.3 4.4 15.1 1.5
Market tightness response-no smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0 0.5380 9.7 6.6 1.9 6.7 1.43
ω = 0.2
Strict inflation targeting 1.5 0 0 0.7804 0 42.9 12.4 42.5 4.7
Output response-with smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0.8 0.5476 1.9 35.2 10.2 34.8 3.9
Output response-no smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0 0.3849 4.4 25.2 7.3 25.02 2.97
Market tightness response-with smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0.8 0.3446 7.2 12.6 3.6 12.4 1.6
Market tightness response-no smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0 0.4235 8.7 6.1 1.8 6.06 1.4
ω = 0.4
Strict inflation targeting 1.5 0 0 0.1491 0 14.3 4.3 14.6 3.2
Output response-with smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0.8 0.1378 1.2 12.7 3.8 13.01 2.9
Output response-no smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0 0.1610 1.4 10.2 3.1 10.4 2.5
Market tightness response-with smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0.8 0.1956 4.6 7.9 2.3 8.01 1.8
Market tightness response-no smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0 0.3231 7.00 4.8 1.4 4.8 1.4
ω = 0.7
Strict inflation targeting 1.5 0 0 0.075 0 2.6 1.1 3.7 2.4
Output response-with smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0.8 0.0784 0.9 2.4 0.99 3.4 2.3
Output response-no smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0 0.1088 2.6 2.24 0.85 2.9 2.1
Market tightness response-with smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0.8 0.0898 1.8 2.3 0.89 3.1 2.01
Market tightness response-no smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0 0.1531 3.9 2.1 0.7 2.4 1.65
ω = 0.9
Strict inflation targeting 1.5 0 0 0.0689 0 5.3 0.27 0.91 2.1
Output response-with smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0.8 0.0724 0.82 5.18 0.24 0.84 2.01
Output response-no smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0 0.0989 2.3 4.98 0.22 0.74 1.9
Market tightness response-with smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0.8 0.0703 0.59 5.03 0.25 0.86 1.97
Market tightness response-no smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0 0.0867 1.85 4.6 0.23 0.77 1.8
Table (2.3) also reveals that by raising the bargaining weight of workers the welfare losses
of the three monetary rules substantially drop such that at the Hosios efficiency level the welfare
costs are more than 95% lesser compared to the welfare costs of the baseline calibration case
ω = 0.05. The higher is the workers bargaining power the lower are the welfare costs of monetary
rules.
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Figure 2.2: The Frictional Labor Market Economy: the Welfare Costs of Responding to Output
2.5.2.1 Interpretation
What are the main reasons behind these results? To understand the basic intuitions behind these
results I use the welfare-relevant notion of efficiency for general equilibrium matching models
developed by Arseneau and Chugh (2012). This welfare relevant notion helps to shed light on
the role of inflation in inducing optimal fluctuations in the wedges between the marginal rate
of substitution and the marginal rate of transformation that have both static and intertemporal
dimensions.4
The following two equations (2.39) and (2.40) define static and intertemporal efficiency con-
ditions related to the allocations of labor market with matching frictions. These two conditions
are obtained by maximizing Eq. (2.1) subject to the Eqs. (2.30) and (2.34).
H
′
(LFPt)
u′ (Ct)
= γ
mS (St , ϑt)
mϑ (St , ϑt)
, (2.39)
1 = Et
{
βu′ (Ct+1)
u′ (Ct)
{
(1−ρ)γ [1−mS (St+1, ϑt+1)]/mϑ (St+1, ϑt+1)
[γ/mϑ (St , ϑt)]−Zt
}}
(2.40)
mS(.) and mϑ (.) are the marginal products of the matching function. The static efficiency
4It’s worth mentioning that while in the Arseneau and Chugh (2012) framework achieving intertemporal effi-
ciency in the decentralized equilibrium is possible, it is not so in my framework because of the presence of imperfect
competition.
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condition (2.39) states that the efficiency of labor markets requires the equality between the mar-
ginal rate of substitution between Ct and LFPt (
H
′
(LFPt)
u′(Ct)
) and the marginal rate of transformation
between Ct and LFPt (γ mS(St ,ϑt)mϑ (St ,ϑt)). The intertemporal efficiency (2.40) is achieved through the
equality between the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution between Ct and Ct+1 (
u
′
(Ct)
βu′(Ct+1)
)
and the intertemporal marginal rate of transformation between Ct and Ct+1 (
{
(1−ρ)γ[1−mS(St+1,ϑt+1)]/mϑ (St+1,ϑt+1)
[γ/mϑ (St ,ϑt)]−Zt
}
).5
Now, the next two conditions show the features that create inefficiencies in a matching model.
These features are labor income tax rates, a demand for money, the presence of imperfect com-
petition and nominal rigidities, a low value for ω and χ 6= 0.
H
′
(LFPt)
λt = {χ+(1− τt)γ
ω
1−ωQt}
= γ κ1−κQt{χ(1−κ)γκQt 1[1+A(1−R−1t )] +(1− τt)
ω(1−κ)
(1−ω)κ
1
[1+A(1−R−1t )]
} , (2.41)
γQκt
ζ = ZtMCt (1−ω)−
(1−ω)
(1−τt)χ
+
(1−ρ)β [1+A(1−R−1t )]
u′(Ct)
Et{ γQ
κ
t+1
ζ
u
′
(Ct+1)
[1+A(1−R−1t+1)]
[1−ω+ ω(1−τt+1)(1−τt)
(
1−ζQ1−κt+1
)
]} (2.42)
In obtaining these expressions I used the fact that λt
[
1+A
(
1−R−1t
)]
= u
′
(Ct) and the derivatives
of Eq. (2.29) with respect to St and ϑt .
Comparing Eq. (2.41) with the efficient condition (2.39) shows that once A 6= 0, ω 6= κ and
χ 6= 0 achieving static efficiency is possible through an appropriate setting of income tax rate
τt . This is not the case, however, for the intertemporal efficiency conditions. Specifically, since
MCt 6= 1, due to the presence of imperfect competition and the fact that the government has no ac-
cess to lump-sum taxes to finance output subsidies aimed at eliminating monopolistic distortions
in product and factor markets, achieving full intertemporal efficiency which is the paramount con-
cern of the social planner in the DSGE models based on the matching framework is not possible.
Therefore once the bargaining power on the part of workers is low, the Ramsey government finds it
optimal to impose an extremely high annual inflation rate which is also highly volatile, along with
high fluctuations in nominal interest and income tax rates, to achieve near intertemporal efficiency
by minimizing intertemporal distortions over time as much as possible in spite of the existence
of sticky prices. Remember that fluctuations in inflation affect the intertemporal efficiency condi-
tion (2.42) through the marginal utility of wealth λt which enters directly into the Phillips curve
condition (2.22).
5This brief analysis is based on Arseneau and Chugh (2012). They develop, nicely, a welfare relevant notion of
efficiency for search and matching models. To see these derivations in more details I refer you to their paper.
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To make this analysis more clear table (2.4) documents a number of sample moments of key
macroeconomic variables under the Ramsey-optimal policy for different values of the bargaining
parameter ω . The first row of table that displays the quantitative results for the baseline calibration
ω = 0.05 makes it very clear that the Ramsey-optimal monetary policy features a very volatile rate
of inflation with a mean that is significantly high and equal to 25 percent per year. At the same
time the optimal fiscal policy calls for a highly volatile income tax rate. In fact, because the labor
market tightness is extremely volatile, the Ramsey government uses an appropriate combination of
time-varying inflation, nominal interest and labor tax rates to minimize intertemporal distortions.
However, it is inflation, both its mean and its standard deviation, that plays the crucial role in indu-
cing efficient fluctuations in labor market. Although not reported here, there is, indeed, a trade-off
between the mean and the standard deviation of inflation in achieving wedge smoothing. In the
absence of a demand for money by households, A = 0, the optimal rate of inflation falls to very
near zero and the standard deviation of inflation rises from 4% to more than 15.5% per year. The
reason behind the optimality of an extreme inflation rate lies in two facts. First, money demand
friction on the part of households on the one hand directly enters the Phillips curve and so has a
direct effect on inflation. On the other hand, such a friction also enters static and intertemporal
wedges, as the Eqs.(2.41) and (2.42) clearly show, due to the matching frictions and the optimal
vacancy creation condition. Taken together these two facts, the existence of money demand fric-
tion by households induces the Ramsey planner to use inflation to minimize intertemporal and
static distortions to ensure efficient labor market fluctuations.
This result, that it is optimal for the Ramsey planner to impose an extremely high inflation rate
and to use unexpected variations in it, is very striking given that the presence of price adjustment
costs which make the use of inflation costly would make one to expect that the monetary policy is
the most appropriate instrument to deal with the sticky price distortion and it should be the labor
tax rate as the most appropriate instrument to deal with distortions in the labor market. However,
the results show that this is not the case and in fact the optimal volatility of inflation is even higher
than the optimal volatility of labor tax rate once the worker’s bargaining power is low enough.
Taking all these together, therefore, in these circumstances it is reasonable to expect that strict
inflation targeting causes extremely large welfare losses because it reduces the inflation variab-
ility and its mean to zero and induces substantially high and inefficient fluctuations in static and
intertemporal wedges, shown by σSW and σIW , respectively, and in the labor market tightness,
Q, in the face of two shocks, in comparison with the optimal policy, as the last five columns of
table (2.3) and the impulse responses to the shocks, presented in the next subsection, clearly show.
These columns make it clear that the reason the rules that respond to the labor market tightness
and output imply lower welfare costs than a strict inflation targeting rule, once ω is low, is that
they induce large variability in inflation and smaller fluctuations in intertemporal wedge and labor
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market tightness. This is remarkably the case for the rule that responds to Q. Interestingly, in
the case of the output targeting rule the main reason that makes it significantly welfare inferior to
the simple interest-rate rule that responds solely to inflation in the New Keynesian models with
Walrasian labor markets is that this rule induces variability in inflation. While in the context of
this model with frictional labor markets this is exactly the reason that makes it welfare superior to
the strict inflation targeting rule. Indeed in the standard New Keynesian models the optimal policy
features an inflation volatility that is near zero while the response to output rule makes inflation re-
latively volatile that is not optimal and costly. However this Taylor rule still in the present context
implies large welfare losses, because, compared to the optimal policy, it still generates high vari-
abilities in static and intertemporal wedges and labor market tightness, which lead to inefficient
fluctuations in labor markets.
To understand why increasing the bargaining weight reduces the welfare costs of monetary
rules, we should regard the Ramsey-optimal policy implications of higher bargaining weights.
A comparison of the panel B and next panels of table (2.4) with panel A of that table shows
that by raising ω the optimal policy features substantially lower variability in tax rate, nominal
interest and inflation rates, such that at the Hosios efficiency level ω = 0.4 and higher the optimal
inflation volatility is close to zero. The optimal variability of income tax rate also drops to about 1
percent per year at the Hosios level and even lower for higher values of ω . Although not reported
here, these optimal moments implied by the high values of bargaining power are very close to the
optimal moments implied by the Walrasian labor market model.6
Although in a quite different environment with imperfect competition, sticky prices and non-
state contingent bonds, my quantitative results on optimal tax volatility is 2 percent lower than
Arseneau and Chugh (2012) reports. In terms of volatility relative to that of GDP, volatility of the
income tax rate is 5.6 percent in their economy, while 3.6 percent in my model. The reason is that
their economy is a real economy and there is no nominal aspect in it. While the present model is
a monetary model and it is the inflation rate that plays the main role of shock absorbing. Regard-
ing the negative relationship between the optimal inflation volatility and the worker’s bargaining
power, it contrasts with the conclusions from a related analysis in Faia (2009). Faia derives op-
timal monetary policy in a model with matching frictions, monopolistic and sticky prices. More
precisely, she finds that in response to government expenditure and technology shocks the optimal
inflation volatility increases with the workers’ bargaining power. There are, however, several con-
trasts between her framework and analysis and mine. First, Faia assumes lump sum taxes and so
no fiscal policy. Second, she doesn’t include the unemployment benefits in her model. Third, she
doesn’t incorporate a labor force participation decision in her model and households utility func-
6It is worth mentioning that I do not address and report the results for the case that the unemployment benefits are
absent because in this case the zero lower bound on nominal interest rate was violated most of the time.
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tion is a function of only consumption. Fourth, the standard deviation of inflation in her model for
different values of bargaining power is also extremely low and in the range of (0.02-0.12) which
in the present framework are accounted as near zero.
For different calibrations and different utility functional forms and even the availability of
lump-sum taxes, this negative relation still clearly holds. However, once I exclude the distortion-
ary income taxes from the model and assume lump-sum taxes and the unemployment transfers are
also assumed to be zero (χ = 0) , I get qualitatively the same results as Faia, but of course quantit-
atively the results change very much. More specifically, in this case there is a positive relationship
between the optimal inflation volatility and the bargaining power. However, with lump-sum taxes
and for the baseline ω = 0.05 the optimal inflation volatility is much lower than the case with
distortionary taxes and smaller than 0.5 percent per year.
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Table 2.4: Ramsey-optimal policy with different values for ω
variable mean Std.dev Autocorrelation
A. w = 0.05
τ 25.5 3.6 0.2002
pi 24.9 4.002 0.3672
R 29.9 3.7 0.4296
out put 0.55 0.89 0.7693
staticwedge 0.65 3.5 0.6533
intertemporal wedge 0.49 1.8 0.5574
Q 0.48 1.1 0.5882
B. w = 0.1
τ 28.3 2.6 0.2417
pi 8.3 3.2 0.3990
R 12.2 2.6 0.7856
out put 0.55 0.98 0.8083
staticwedge 0.69 3.1 0.4752
intertemporal wedge 0.43 1.04 0.4831
Q 0.69 3.6 0.4821
C. ω = 0.4
τ 26.6 1.15 0.8847
pi -0.28 0.57 0.2555
R 3.8 0.54 0.8378
out put 0.55 0.93 0.9065
staticwedge 0.86 3.4 0.9510
intertemporal wedge 0.32 0.99 0.9520
Q 0.66 3.4 0.9520
D. ω = 0.9
τ 20.3 0.84 0.9204
pi -0.23 0.14 0.0273
R 3.8 0.38 0.6347
out put 0.55 0.82 0.9051
staticwedge 2.9 2.37 0.9162
intertemporal wedge 0.12 0.1 0.9280
Q 0.68 0.36 0.9280
Note: Rt and pit are expressed in percent per year, and τt is expressed in percent. The steady-state values of out put, Q and wedges are expressed in levels. The standard deviations and serial
correlations of these 4 variables correspond to percent deviations from their steady-state values.
2.5.3 Monetary Policy Rules Responses to Shocks
How does strict inflation targeting and responses to output or labor market tightness affect, qual-
itatively and quantitatively, the responses of key macro variables to aggregate shocks? To address
this question I compare, for the baseline calibration, the responses to government expenditure
shock (figure (2.3)) and technology shock (figure (2.4)) of all variables of the model under the
64
Ramsey-optimal policy (cyan lines), under the strict inflation targeting rule (magenta lines), the
response to output (black lines) and the response to market tightness (green lines), both without
interest-rate smoothing. The figures suggest remarkable deviations of the impulse responses as-
sociated with the strict inflation targeting rule and also the response to output rule, although signi-
ficantly smaller deviations in comparison with the strict inflation targeting rule, from the Ramsey
optimal responses. On the other hand, the equilibrium dynamics of most of endogenous vari-
ables induced by the response to labor market tightness policy rule mimic those associated with
the Ramsey economy quite well. The only variable that its dynamics is very different from the
optimal policy is public debt.
Both figures make clear that how the strict inflation targeting rule induces extremely inefficient
fluctuations in static and intertemporal wedges which lead to far departures from intertemporal
efficiency, that is the paramount concern of the social planner in the frictional labor markets.
Also, as is well known in matching frictions literature, with constant returns matching, labor
market tightness, Qt , is a good summary statistics of period t labor market outcomes. While in
response to the both shocks the optimal policy keeps fluctuations in labor market tightness as
small as possible, the strict inflation targeting role features highly inefficient fluctuations in that
variable. This is also, to some extent, the case for the role that responds to output. While the role
that responds to labor market tightness in almost all cases induces responses to the shocks that are
virtually the same as the optimal policy responses. Both figures, however, make clear that it is the
price stability rule that in all cases induces very larger deviations from the optimal responses.
2.6 Lump-Sum Taxation
Keeping fixed the structural parameters from the fiscal-policy model, I now rule out distortionary
labor income taxes and assume that the government has access to lump-sum tax/transfers vis-a-vis
households, which allows me to ignore government financing issues. This is the common practice
in all of the existing papers on optimal monetary policy in New Keynesian frameworks with search
and matching frictions. In such models, the presence of lump-sum taxes makes the government
budget constraint a residual object. The top panel of table (2.5) displays results for the baseline
calibration of the general equilibrium model. It shows that the welfare costs of the strict infla-
tion targeting rule relative to the Ramsey-optimal policy conditional on the initial state being the
deterministic Ramsey steady state drops from 23.8419 percent of consumption per period in the
presence of distortionary taxes to only 0.3378 percent of consumption per period in the absence
of distortionary taxes. This implies a decline by more than 98 percent in the welfare losses asso-
ciate with strict inflation targeting. At the same time, response to labor market tightness, with or
without interest-rate smoothing, leads to significantly higher welfare costs than the strict inflation
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Figure 2.3: Dynamic Path for the Frictional Labor Market Economy with Different Monetary Policy Rules in Response to 1 Percent Positive
Shock to Gt .
Figure 2.4: Dynamic Path for the Frictional Labor Market Economy with Different Monetary Policy Rules in Response to 1 Percent Positive
Shock to Zt .
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targeting rule. In the case of response to output, while with interest-rate smoothing the rule implies
virtually the same welfare losses, and even a bit lower, as the strict inflation targeting rule but it
leads to larger welfare costs in the absence of interest-rate smoothing. However, although not re-
ported here, in a sharp contrast to the fiscal-policy model, with or without interest-rate smoothing,
the welfare costs monotonically increase in output coefficient.
Two other results which worth to emphasize are that: first, like the case with labor income
taxes, the model features a negative relationship between the welfare costs associated with the
simple monetary rules and worker’s bargaining power. Second, for high workers bargaining power
the welfare costs associated with the monetary rules are virtually feature identical in the two
models.
Table 2.5: Welfare Comparison of Alternative Monetary Policy Rules-Lump Sum Taxation
Worker’s bargaining power Monetary policy rules αpi αY αq αR welfare cost σpi σQ
(Θ×100)
ω = 0.05
Strict inflation targeting 1.5 0 0 0.3378 0 26.6
Output response-with smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0.8 0.3256 0.4 25.3
Output response-no smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0 0.3872 1.1 23.6
Market tightness response-with smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0.8 0.8287 2.7 18.5
Market tightness response-no smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0 1.9519 4.6 13.5
ω = 0.1
Strict inflation targeting 1.5 0 0 0.2824 0 20.7
Output response-with smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0.8 0.2772 0.27 20.1
Output response-no smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0 0.3060 0.73 19.2
Market tightness response-with smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0.8 0.6902 2.3 15.6
Market tightness response-no smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0 1.8049 4.1 11.9
ω = 0.4
Strict inflation targeting 1.5 0 0 0.1009 0 6.9
Output response-with smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0.8 0.1040 0.2 6.7
Output response-no smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0 0.1297 0.57 6.5
Market tightness response-with smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0.8 0.1759 0.9 6.1
Market tightness response-no smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0 0.4785 1.99 5.4
ω = 0.9
Strict inflation targeting 1.5 0 0 0.0829 0 0.65
Output response-with smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0.8 0.0862 0.2 0.62
Output response-no smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0 0.1066 0.49 0.6
Market tightness response-with smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0.8 0.0844 0.12 0.63
Market tightness response-no smoothing 1.5 0.5/4 0 0.0968 0.37 0.62
67
Figure 2.5: Dynamic Path for the Canonical New Keynesian Economies with and without Matching Frictions in Response to 1 Percent
Positive Shock to Gt .
2.7 Near Random Walk Property of Inflation under Low Bar-
gaining Power
To ascertain the role played by a low value for the bargaining power of workers in a frictional labor
market in shaping the economy’s response to the fiscal shock, I compare the model’s implied
responses to that shock in the presence or not of such frictions. A perfectly competitive labor
market is assumed in the case of no frictions.
The most important policy implications of models featuring a New Keynesian Phillips curve
is the optimality of price stability. In those models once both monetary and fiscal policies are
jointly considered, the Ramsey government in response to a positive fiscal shock doesn’t change
inflation because it is costly and, instead, finances its expenditures partly through public debt and
partly through tax rates. In fact, these two variables in response to the fiscal shock are permanently
affected and exhibit random walk behavior.
Figure (2.5) depicts the response of a number of endogenous variables to a one percent in-
crease in the government expenditures. The figure displays impulse response functions associated
with the Walrasian labor markets model (the red line) and with two alternative values for the bar-
gaining power, ω = 0.05 and ω = 0.7, in frictional labor markets model (the cyan and yellow
lines, respectively). In a stark contrast to the standard New Keynesian frameworks prediction, in
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response to the positive fiscal shock and once ω = 0.05, not only the Ramsey government finds
it optimal to increase the price level on impact, but also the inflation rare is permanently affected
by the shock and exhibits a random walk behavior. On the other hand, and again in contrast to
the New Keynesian model, once ω = 0.05, public debt due to the sharp rise in inflation drops on
impact and then rises permanently and the income tax rate while rises on impact but doesn’t show
any random walk behavior and after two quarters converges to zero. Raising worker’s bargaining
power to ω = 0.7, changes the impulse responses dramatically. Not only increase in inflation is
not optimal at all but also both public debt and income tax rate rise and are permanently affected,
which are very in line with the standard New Keynesian model predictions. To see it more clearly
that how the income tax rate for ω = 0.7 becomes a near-random-walk the bottom right panel of
figure (2.5) displays the income tax response for only this case and the standard New Keynesian
model. In both cases the income tax rate exhibits a near-random-walk behavior. Therefore, for
high values of ω , in line with the standard results, the planner in response to an unexpected in-
crease in government spending does not generate a surprise increase in the price level. Instead,
in order to finance the increase in government purchases, it chooses to do that partly through an
increase in income tax rates and partly through an increase in public debt.
The figure makes quite clear that when the workers bargaining power is high, the Ramsey im-
pulse responses to an innovation in government purchases are qualitatively and even quantitatively
in both Walrasian and frictional labor markets models with sticky prices close to each other.
2.8 Conclusion
In this paper I explored the implications of different levels of worker’s bargaining power for op-
timal monetary policy and for three monetary policy rules in a general equilibrium search frame-
work that incorporates a labor force participation decision under sticky prices. I also shed light on
the different implications of Ramsey-optimal policy for inflation and other key macro variables
in the presence and absence of matching frictions. I find that the workers bargaining weight is a
crucial parameter for the welfare costs of monetary policy rules. The lower is workers bargain-
ing power the higher is the optimal inflation volatility and the welfare losses of monetary rules
responding to inflation. My quantitative findings indicate that the welfare losses associated with
the rules that respond to output and, specifically, labor market tightness targeting are remarkably
lower than the welfare losses associated with strict inflation targeting rule. In contrast to the ex-
isting literature that finds that responding to output is always welfare detrimental compared to
the strict inflation targeting rule, my results suggest that this is not the case once the bargaining
power of workers is low. I also show that with a low value for the bargaining parameter, the Ram-
sey government not only finds it optimal to use inflation surprises in response to a positive fiscal
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shock, but also inflation exhibits a near random walk behavior. At the same time, another main
policy implication of the New Keynesian models with distortionary taxes that the tax rate has unit
roots doesn’t hold in this case. Important to emphasize is that both low worker’s bargaining power
and the presence of distortionary labor income taxes are necessary to generate the main optimal
inflation volatility and extremely high inflation rate results.
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Chapter 3
The Friedman rule in monetary economies
with cash-in-advance for firms
3.1 Introduction
“Our final rule for the optimum quantity of money is that it will be attained by a rate of price
deflation that makes the nominal rate of interest equal to zero. Friedman (1969) wrote in “The
Optimum Quantity of Money”. By setting money growth at a rate that causes a deflation equal
in magnitude to the real rate of return to physical assets, the central bank can make the return to
holding money equal to the return to holding bonds. With that rate of deflation, the nominal in-
terest rate is zero. The intuition for the Friedman rule is that because the marginal cost of creating
additional money is zero, the opportunity cost of holding money, the nominal interest rate, faced
by private agents should be zero. The main criticism to the Friedman rule is attributed to Phelps
(1973). Phelps noted that analyzing inflation tax without consumption and labor supply functions
is like that “professor Friedman has given us Hamlet without prince”. In a public finance context
and a general equilibrium model where inflation tax is optimally treated like other distortionary
taxes, Phelps counterargued the optimality of the Friedman rule in favor of a positive rate of infla-
tion. Following Phelps a large literature that tried to analyze the optimal inflation rate in different
models from different point of views, emerged.
In all this body of work that studied the optimality of the Friedman rule, except Faig (1991), 1
1Faig (1991) studied the optimality of the Friedman rule when the transactions activity is performed by firms.
There are several difference between his model and this approach. First, his model is a simple one-period static
model but here I consider a stochastic and dynamic general equilibrium model. Second, he introduces money as
an intermediate good in the transactions activity, here the role of money is as a medium of exchange by requiring
explicitly that money be used to purchase goods. Third, in Faig paper policy evaluations do not take the Ramsey
approach to solve the problem.
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one motivates the existence of a liquidity premium by supposing that households obtain a service
flow from cash balances. Realistically it is not only households that have motivation to hold
cash balances, but firms as well. Important to emphasize is that in these frameworks that the
attention is restricted to the case in which money is hold only by households, variations in the
nominal interest rate affect real variables solely through their effect on aggregate demand. This
paper studies the optimality of the Friedman rule by considering a demand for money by firms
that is motivated by the facts that a substantial part of M1 is held by firms. For example, the
Federal Reserve’s demand deposit ownership survey (1988) surveyed changes over the 1980’s in
the shares of demand deposits. According to DDOS, consumers held one-third of demand deposits
at all insured commercial banks in 1980. This share had declined to about one-quarter by 1987
while holdings of demand deposits by financial and non-financial businesses rose from three-fifths
to about two-thirds of total demand deposits.2 Also Mulligan (1997) estimates a model of the
demand for money by firms using longitudinal data on sales, money holdings, and other variables
at the firm level. He shows, using COMPUSTAT data on 12,000 firms for the years 1961–92,
in industrialized economies about two-thirds of M1 are held by firms. Also a large literature
in finance documented a very significant increase in cash holdings by firms during the recent
years.3 It is therefore natural to motivate a demand for money by firms and study the optimality
of the Friedman rule under this motivation. My purpose in this paper is to pursue this line of
reasoning. The focus is to investigate whether the policy conclusion arrived at by the existing
literature regarding the optimality of the Friedman rule is robust with respect to a more realistic
specification of the economic environment, that is, where firms have motivations to hold money.
To do so, I consider monetary economies models, somehow similar to the models described in
Chari et al. (1996) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004). Specifically, I build models to study the
optimality of the Friedman rule in a stochastic, flexible-price, production economy without capital,
where two sources of inefficiency in the models stem from the nominal friction of the demand
for cash balances by firms and a distortionary tax. I rationalize a money demand by firms by
assuming that wage payments are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint. This is a very common
assumption in the literature ( for a review see Christiano et al. (2010)). I show that the Friedman
rule, irrespective of the form of the utility function and in the presence of distortionary taxes
on consumption, is not optimal. It can be shown that it is also the case with distortionary taxes
on labor instead of consumption. This non-optimality of the Friedman rule recalls the Phelps’s
criticism that Friedman’s first best argument ignores the second best fact that inflation produces
seigniorage incomes for the fiscal authority and all forms of taxation produce distortions of some
2The Federal Reserve surveys for years prior to this period also show that a substantial part of M1 was held by
firms. The Federal Reserve discontinued the DDOS in 1990.
3See for example Ferreira and Vilela (2004), Almeida et al. (2004), Han and Qiu (2007), Bates et al. (2009) and
Gao et al. (2013) among so many others.
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kind. More precisely, it is not anymore optimal to put nominal interest rate equal to zero when the
government has no access to lump-sum taxes and only to one distorting tax. Put another way, the
optimal way to deal with a distortion depends on other existing distortion.
I then follow Jones et al. (1997), and consider a model where households sell two types of
labor, raw and effective labors, to the market. In contrast to the cash-credit goods model that both
goods have the same price, different types of labor face different wages. I assume that only the raw
labor wages are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint. My motivation for this assumption comes
from the facts that there are a range of jobs where the employee is paid his wages on hourly basis.
In this case, the optimality of the Friedman rule with distorting consumption taxes reemerged if
the production function exhibits constant-returns-to-scale and the utility function is a homothetic
function of those two types of labor and separable in consumption. This optimality is valid in the
presence of different wages for the two labor types. This is an advantage of the model over the
cash-credit goods model where in order to have the optimality of the Friedman rule both goods
have to have the same price. If the production technology has decreasing or increasing-returns-to-
scale, then the optimality of the Friedman rule needs the equality of wage rates. The optimality of
the Friedman rule with two types of labor, homotheticity and separability of preferences is similar
to the result of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972). They find that if the preferences are homothetic over
consumption goods and separable in labor then it is optimal to tax all consumption goods at the
same rate. Thus, once the Friedman rule is not optimal, that is Rt > 1, then in fact the raw labor
wages are taxed at a higher rate than the efficient labor wages which is not optimal.
The government in these environments issues nominal, one period, non-state-contingent bonds,
prints money and impose distortionary taxes on consumption to finance its expenditure.
3.2 The model
This section develops an infinite-horizon production economy with perfectly competitive product
markets and flexible prices. A demand for money by firms is motivated by assuming that wage
payments are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint. The government finances an exogenous
stream of purchases by printing money, imposes distorting taxes only on labor income and issuing
one-period nominally risk-free bonds.
3.2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical households who consume different varieties
of goods, save and work. Households save in one-period, non state-contingent, nominal bonds and
their preferences are defined over consumption, ct , and labor effort, ht . The household seeks to
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maximize
E0
∞
∑
t=0
β tU (ct ,ht) , (3.1)
Where E0 denotes the mathematical expectations operator conditional on information available
at time zero and β is the subjective discount factor. The utility function U is strictly concave and
satisfies the Inada conditions.
The flow budget constraint of the household in period t reads as follows:
ptct (1+ τt)+Bt+1 ≤ ptwtht +Rt−1Bt +Πt . (3.2)
where households are assumed to invest in non-state contingent nominal bonds, Bt+1, which
pay a nominal interest rate Rt one period later. τt is the distorting tax on consumption, wt is the
real wage rate and Πt are profits received from firms. Households are also assumed to be subject
to a borrowing limit that prevents them from engaging in Ponzi schemes.
Households choose the set of processes {ct , ht , Bt+1}, taking as given the set of processes
{pt , wt , Rt , τt} so as to maximize utility 3.1 subject to the budget constraint 3.2. The first-order
conditions are:
Uc (ct ,ht) = λt (1+ τt) (3.3)
Uh (ct ,ht) = λtwt , (3.4)
λt
Pt
= βRtEt
λt+1
Pt+1
, (3.5)
where λt refer to the Lagrange multiplier on equation 3.2.
The interpretation of these equilibrium conditions is as follows: Eq. 3.3 states that the distor-
tionary taxes distort the equality between the marginal utilities of consumption and wealth. Eq.
3.4 shows that the equality between marginal utility of leisure and the marginal utility of labor
income. Eq. 3.5 is the Euler condition with respect to bonds.
3.2.2 Firms
Firms use labor to produce consumption goods. One unit of labor is assumed to produce one
unit of good which is perishable. Firms money holdings are motivated by assuming that wage
payments are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint of the form:
wtht ≤ mt , (3.6)
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where mt = Mtpt is the demand for real money balances by firms in period t and Mt denotes nominal
money holdings.
The period by period budget constraint that the firm faces is
Mt = Mt−1+ ptht− ptwtht− ptΠt , (3.7)
The firm chooses {ht , Mt} to solve the following maximization problem :
MaxΠt = E0
∞
∑
t=0
β t
λt
λ0
1
pt
{ptht− ptwtht +Mt−1−Mt} (3.8)
subject to eq. (3.6).
λt
λ0
is the period 0 value to the representative household of period t goods, which the firm uses
to discount profit flows because households are the ultimate owners of firms.
This maximization implies the following first-order condition:
1
wt
= 2−R−1t , (3.9)
From this optimality condition it is clear that the presence of a cash constraint for firms intro-
duces a financial cost of labor which is an increasing function of nominal interest rate.
3.2.3 The government
The budget constraint that the government is facing is given by
Mt +Bt + ptτtct = Rt−1Bt−1+Mt−1+ ptgt . (3.10)
The consolidated government issues one period nominally risk-free bonds, Bt , prints money,
Mt , imposes distortionary taxes, and faces a stream of public consumption, denoted by gt .
3.3 Competitive equilibrium
Absent arbitrage opportunities in equilibrium implies that, Rt ≥ 1. This implies that based on eq.
3.9, 1≥ wt in equilibrium must hold.
A competitive equilibrium is a set of plans {ct , ht , Mt , Bt , wt , λt , Rt , pt}, satisfying eqs. (3.3),
(3.4), (3.5), (3.6), (3.9), (3.10) and :
Rt ≥ 1, (3.11)
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1≥ wt , (3.12)
Uc (ct ,ht)≥ (1+ τt)Uh (ct ,ht) , (3.13)
ct +gt = ht , (3.14)
given policies {Rt , τt} .
Eq. 3.9 denotes that the nominal interest rate distorts the equality between the marginal
product and real wages and eq. 3.11 ensures that in equilibrium, the nominal interest rate is
non-negative. Eqs 3.12 and 3.13 result from the non-negativity of nominal interest rate and Eq.
3.14 shows the real resource constraint.
3.3.1 The Ramsey problem
The optimal fiscal and monetary policy is the process {τt , Rt} associated with the competitive
equilibrium that yields the highest level of utility to the representative households. We know that
if the initial financial wealth held by consumers is positive, the welfare is maximized by increasing
the initial price level to infinity. To avoid this feature, I restrict the initial price level to be given.
3.3.1.1 the primal form
The problem of determining the optimal structure of prices and taxes to finance a given level of
expenditures is called the Ramsey problem, after the classic treatment of Ramsey (1928). In the
representative agent models, like one studied here, the Ramsey problem is to maximize the utility
of the representative agent subject to the government’s revenue requirement.
There are two approaches to solve this problem. The first approach, often called the dual ap-
proach employs the indirect utility function to express utility as a function of the government’s
control variables. The second approach, called the primal approach, that is considered here, in-
volves the elimination of all prices and tax rates from the equilibrium conditions, so that the
resulting reduced form involves only real variables. The primal form of the equilibrium condi-
tions, consists of two equations. One equation is a feasibility constraint, given by the resource
constraint 3.14, which must hold at every date and under all contingencies. The other equation is
a single, present-value constraint known as the implementability constraint.
The real variables that appear in the primal form are consumption and labor effort. I obtain
the Ramsey problem as follows. Iterating the government budget constraint forward and using the
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first-order conditions to eliminate prices yields the following implementability condition
E0
∞
∑
t=0
β t [Uc (ct ,ht)Ct +Uh (ct ,ht)ht ] = A0
λ0
P0
, (3.15)
Uc (ct ,ht)≥ (1+ τt)Uh (ct ,ht) , (3.16)
ct +gt = ht , (3.17)
given A0 = (M−1+R−1B−1), λ0 =Uc (c0,h0) and P0, are the same as those satisfying the compet-
itive equilibrium
3.3.1.2 Non-optimality of the Friedman rule
The Ramsey problem is to maximize the lifetime utility function subject to eqs. (3.15) - (3.17).
Let focus on the less restricted form and ignore the inequality constraint (3.16).
Let ϕ and ψt denote the Lagrange multipliers on the implementability constraint (3.15) and
on the feasibility constraint (3.17), respectively.
The F.O.Cs of the Ramsey planner’s problem are
∂L
∂ct
=Uc (ct ,ht)+ϕUhc (ct ,ht)ht +ϕUc (ct ,ht)+ϕUcc (ct ,ht)ct−ψt = 0,
∂L
∂ht
=Uh (ct ,ht)−ϕUhh (ct ,ht)ht +ϕUh (ct ,ht)+ϕUch (ct ,ht)ct +ψt = 0.
After rewriting the above equations we get the following expressions
(1+ϕ)+ϕ
(
Ucc (ct ,ht)ct +Uhc (ct ,ht)ht
Uc (ct ,ht)
)
=
ψt
Uc (ct ,ht)
,
(1+ϕ)+ϕ
(
Uch (ct ,ht)ct +Uhh (ct ,ht)ht
Uh (ct ,ht)
)
=
−ψt
Uh (ct ,ht)
.
As it is quite clear the optimality conditions of the Ramsey problem imply the non-optimality
of the Friedman rule. Because from eq. (3.9) it is clear that once the Friedman rule is optimal
Rt = 1 then wt = 1 and Uc (ct ,ht) = (1+ τt)Uh (ct ,ht) but we cannot conclude this from the above
conditions.
Thus we conclude that in a model with cash constraint for firms and in the presence of distor-
tionary taxes only on consumption, the Friedman rule is not optimal. The basic intuition for this
conclusion recalls the result due to Phelps (1973). Phelps in a model with the money-in-the-utility
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function and distorting labor income taxes shows that the Friedman rule is not optimal because
inflation produces seigniorage revenues for the government. More precisely, instead of just mak-
ing one of the distortions equal to zero and only using the other one, it is optimal to equalize the
marginal distortion caused by one unit of revenue collected with distortionary income tax with
the marginal distortion caused by one unit of revenue collected with inflation tax. This can be
shown that is the case if instead of distorting consumption taxes, the government has access to
only distortionary taxes on labor. When the government has access to both taxes on consumption
and labor income, it also can be shown that the optimal tax policy is not unique and in fact there
are a variety of tax policies that can implement the optimal allocation. Some of these have the
optimality of the Friedman rule, but others do not.
3.4 Optimality of the Friedman rule in an economy with CIA
for firms and raw-effective labors
How the Friedman rule can be optimal when firms are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint? In
this section, following Jones et al. (1997), I assume a model that is added with two features relative
to the model with CIA only for firms in section 3: a raw labor-effective labor model where the
wages of two types of labor are different and only wage payments of raw labor are subject to a
cash-in-advance constraint. I also consider distortionary consumption taxes. I show that in this
set up once the production function is a constant returns to scale function, the Friedman rule is
optimal under homotheticity of preferences between raw and effective labors and separability in
consumption.
3.4.1 Households
Now I assume households draw utility from consumption goods, ct , and disutility from raw labor,
h1t , and effective labor, h2t , according to the following utility function:
E0
∞
∑
t=0
β tU (ct ,h1t ,h2t) ,
The budget constraint can be written as:
(1+ τt)ct +Bt+1 = Rt−1Bt +w1th1t +w2th2t ,
where w1t and w2t are the wage rates of raw and effective labors, respectively.
The first-order conditions of the household problem are eq. (3.5) as before and
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Uc (ct ,h1t ,h2t) = λt(1+ τt), (3.18)
Uh1 (ct ,h1t ,h2t)
Uh2 (ct ,h1t ,h2t)
=
w1t
w2t
, (3.19)
Eq. (3.19) states that the marginal utilities between the two types of labors should be equal to the
their relative wage rates.
3.4.2 Firms
To produce output, I now assume that firms use raw labor h1t and effective labor h2t as inputs. The
production technology is given by ztF (h1t ,h2t), which is homogenous of degree one and zt is an
exogenous, aggregate productivity shock to production. It is also assumed that wage payments of
raw labor are subject to a CIA such that
w1th1t ≤ mt (3.20)
As I mentioned in the introduction, the intuition behind assuming cash constraint for one types
of workers comes from the fact that there are a wide range of jobs where the employee is paid on
hourly basis. For example, based on Lemieux et al. (2009) study of non-performance-pay and in
performance-pay jobs, there is a large fraction of workers paid by the hour in non-performance-
pay.
The firm’s maximization problem is the same as section 2.2 and again the firm uses λtλ0 to
discount profit flows. The first-order conditions of the firm’s maximization problem with respect
to raw labor and effective labor are, respectively,
ztF1 (h1t ,h2t) = w1t
(
2−R−1t
)
, (3.21)
ztF2 (h1t ,h2t) = w2t . (3.22)
As is clear from eqs. (3.21) and( 3.22), the presence of working capital distorts only the
equality between the marginal product and the real wage of raw labor. When Rt > 1 then the raw
labor wage is less than its marginal product. In fact, the financial cost of labor is increasing in the
opportunity cost of holding money, 2−R−1t , which is an increasing function of nominal interest
rate.
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3.4.3 Competitive equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is a set of plans {ct , h1t , h2t , Mt , Bt , w1t , w2t , pt , λt , Rt} satisfying Eqs.
(3.5), (3.10), (3.18)-(3.22) and the following conditions:
Rt =
1
Etrt+1
≥ 1, (3.23)
ztF1 (h1t ,h2t)≥ w1t , (3.24)
ct +gt = ztF (h1t ,h2t) . (3.25)
given policies {Rt ,τt} .
3.4.4 The Ramsey problem and the primal form
The Ramsey policy is the process {τt , Rt} associated with the competitive equilibrium that yields
the highest level of utility to the representative households.
Again, to obtain the Ramsey problem I iterate the government budget constraint forward and
use the first-order conditions to eliminate prices to get implementability condition
E0
∞
∑
t=0
β t [Uc (ct ,h1t ,h2t)ct +Uh1 (ct ,h1t ,h2t)h1t +Uh2 (ct ,h1t ,h2t)h2t ] = A0
λ0
p0
, (3.26)
where A0 = R−1B−1+M−1 and I used the fact that
F (h1t ,h2t) = w1t
(
2−R−1t
)
h1t +w2th2t . (3.27)
The second implementability condition because of no-arbitrage condition is:
F1 (h1t ,h2t)w2t−F2 (h1t ,h2t)w1t ≥ 0, (3.28)
The Ramsey allocation problem must also satisfies the resource constraint 3.25.
3.4.5 Optimality of the Friedman rule
The Ramsey maximization problem consists of maximizing the representative household utility,
subject to eqs. 3.25-3.28.
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Proposition 3.1 The Friedman rule in a raw-efficient labors model with distortionary taxes on
consumption is optimal if the production function is constant-returns-to scale and the utility func-
tion is homothetic in the raw-efficient labor types ans separable in consumption.
Proof. I solve the Ramsey problem for the less restricted problem where the constraint 3.28 is
dropped. Let Θ be the Lagrange multiplier on 3.26 and Λt denotes the Lagrange multiplier on eq.
3.25. Then the first-order conditions are
Uc (ct ,h1t ,h2t)+Θ [Uc (ct ,h1t ,h2t)+Ucc (ct ,h1t ,h2t)ct ]
+Θ [Uh1c (ct ,h1t ,h2t)h1t +Uh2c (ct ,h1t ,h2t)h2t ]−Λt = 0,
(3.29)
Uh1 (ct ,h1t ,h2t)+Θ [Uh1 (ct ,h1t ,h2t)+Uh1h1 (ct ,h1t ,h2t)h1]
+Θ [Uh1c (ct ,h1t ,h2t)ct +Uh2h1 (ct ,h1t ,h2t)h2t ]+ΛtztF1 (h1t ,h2t) = 0,
(3.30)
Uh2 (ct ,h1t ,h2t)+Θ [Uh2 (ct ,h1t ,h2t)+Uh2h2 (ct ,h1t ,h2t)h2]
+Θ [Uch2 (ct ,h1t ,h2t)ct +Uh1h2 (ct ,h1t ,h2t)h1t ]+ΛtztF2 (h1t ,h2t) = 0.
(3.31)
It is hardly possible to reach a conclusion about the optimality of the Friedman rule based on
these first-order conditions. Thus I consider utility functions of the form:
U (ct ,h1t ,h2t) =V (ct ,Q(h1t ,h2t)) (3.32)
,
where Q(h1t ,h2t) is homothetic. Then the first-order conditions 3.30 and 3.31 reduce to
(1+Θ)+Θ
(
Uh1h1 (ct ,h1t ,h2t)h1+Uh2h1 (ct ,h1t ,h2t)h2t
Uh1 (ct ,h1t ,h2t)
)
=−ΛtztF1 (h1t ,h2t)
Uh1 (ct ,h1t ,h2t)
, (3.33)
(1+Θ)+Θ
(
Uh2h2 (ct ,h1t ,h2t)h2+Uh2h1 (ct ,h1t ,h2t)h1t
Uh2 (ct ,h1t ,h2t)
)
=−ΛtztF2 (h1t ,h2t)
Uh2 (ct ,h1t ,h2t)
. (3.34)
From homotheticity we have
(
Uh1h1(ct ,h1t ,h2t)h1+Uh2h1(ct ,h1t ,h2t)h2t
Uh1(ct ,h1t ,h2t)
)
=
(
Uh2h2(ct ,h1t ,h2t)h2+Uh2h1(ct ,h1t ,h2t)h1t
Uh2(ct ,h1t ,h2t)
)
.
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Use this and taking together eqs. 3.33 and 3.34 we have
Uh1 (ct ,h1t ,h2t)
Uh2 (ct ,h1t ,h2t)
=
F1 (h1t ,h2t)
F2 (h1t ,h2t)
, (3.35)
Using this, from 3.19 we have
w1t
w2t
=
F1 (h1t ,h2t)
F2 (h1t ,h2t)
, (3.36)
This solution satisfies eq. 3.28. Thus the solution to the less constrained problem is also a
solution to the Ramsey allocation problem.
Also eqs. 3.21 and 3.22 imply
F1 (h1t ,h2t)
F2 (h1t ,h2t)
=
w1t
w2t
(
2−R−1t
)
. (3.37)
Now from 3.36 and 3.37 we have Rt = 1.
If the production function exhibits decreasing or increasing-returns-to-scale and wage rates
are different, then we cannot anymore have condition 3.27 that resulted because of the presence
of constant-returns-to-scale. Thus the competitive equilibrium conditions don’t anymore reduce
to an implementability constraint and resource constraint. But if wage rates are identical, then
the primal form will be the same and thus the Friedman rule is optimal even when the production
technology doesn’t exhibit constant-returns-to-scale. Thus the standard result of Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1972) in public finance reemerges. That is, once the preferences are homothetic in labor
types and separable in consumption, the distortionary consumption taxes implicitly tax both types
of labors so it is optimal to tax both raw labor and efficient labor at the same rate. In other words,
Rt = 1 is the optimal policy. If Rt > 1, then the raw labor is effectively taxed at a higher rate
than the efficient labor , since wages of raw labor must be paid for immediately but efficient labor
wages are paid for with a one-period lag. Thus, with preferences of the form eq. (3.32) , efficiency
requires that Rt = 1 and, therefore, the Friedman rule is optimal.
It is interesting to compare the optimality of the Friedman rule in this model with a constant-
returns-to-scale production function with the optimality of the Friedman rule in a cash-credit
goods model. In the cash-credit goods model, the Friedman rule is optimal because of the as-
sumption of two types of consumption goods along with the homotheticity of preferences between
cash and credit goods and separability in leisure. In this model the Friedman rule is optimal be-
cause of the two different types of labor and the assumption that the utility function is separable in
consumption goods and homothetic in raw-efficient labor. The advantage of the model with two
different types of labor over the model with two different types of goods is that different types of
labor can face different wages. It is worth to note that in both cases only one type of goods or
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labors should be subject to a cash constraint, otherwise the optimality of the Friedman rule doesn’t
emerge. With distortionary taxes on labor income, it can be shown easily that the Friedman rule
is optimal if income tax rates on both types of labors are the same.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper I study the optimality of the Friedman rule in monetary economies, where money
enters into the model through cash-in-advance constraint for firms. First I show that the Friedman
rule is not optimal when firms have a motive for cash holdings and the government in order to
finance its expenditures imposes distortionary taxes on consumption. Then I prove that the optim-
ality of the Friedman rule holds in a model with cash-in-advance for firms and in the presence of
distortionary consumption taxes, if we consider two types of labor where one of them is subject
to a cash-in-advance constraint and the utility function is homothetic in these two types of labor
and separable in consumption. Unlike the cash-credit goods economy where two types of goods
have the same price, in this model wage rates are different if the production function exhibits a
constant-returns-to-scale. This optimality is also satisfied with increasing or decreasing-returns-
to-scale production functions if wage rates are identical.
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General Conclusion
This dissertation consists of three essays on optimal fiscal and monetary policies. In the first two
essays, I consider general equilibrium search and matching models with money and distortionary
labor income taxes and study the joint determination of optimal fiscal and monetary policy and the
welfare costs of simple monetary policy rules under sticky product prices. The models also incor-
porate a labor force participation decision that has recently attracted attention, since it has been
shown in a number of papers that it can be an important margin of adjustment in labor markets.
The models’ fluctuations are conditional on exogenous government spending and productivity
processes.
In the first essay, I show that, in a sharp contrast to the standard results on the optimality
of price stability in the presence of price adjustment costs, the Ramsey-optimal policy calls for
remarkably high inflation rate and inflation volatility once the worker’s bargaining power is low.
The results in a quite clear way show that the social planner finds it optimal to rely more on
inflation, not fluctuations in distortionary income tax rate, to induce efficient fluctuations in labor
markets by keeping distortions constant over the business cycle. I also find that by increasing
the bargaining weight to the Hosios efficiency level and higher, the optimal inflation rate and its
variability significantly decline to near zero. This is also the case for the Ramsey-optimal volatility
of income taxes.
In the second essay, I study the welfare consequences of simple monetary policy rules in a
DSGE search and matching model with sticky prices, a cash constraint on households expendit-
ures, flexible real wages and distortionary labor income taxes. The monetary rules that I consider
are: a rule that strictly targets inflation rate, and two rules that respond to output and labor market
tightness, with and without interest-rate smoothing. In this context, the point of comparison is the
Ramsey-optimal policy. I find the role of worker’s bargaining weight crucial for the results. When
the workers bargaining power is low, because the optimal inflation rate is significantly high, the
welfare costs associated with the strict inflation targeting rule is remarkably high. The results also
indicate that the rules that respond to output and labor market tightness feature considerably lower
welfare costs than the strict inflation targeting rule. By raising the worker’s bargaining power, the
optimal inflation rate and its volatility and thus the welfare costs associated with the strict inflation
targeting rule remarkably drop and the rules that respond to output or labor market tightness do
not anymore imply lower welfare losses relative to the strict inflation targeting rule.
In the third and last essay, I study the optimality of the Friedman rule in monetary economies
models with two sources of inefficiency, steming from the nominal friction of the demand for cash
balances by firms and distortionary taxes on consumption. The money demands by firms have
been rationalized by assuming that wage payments are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint.
I first show that the Friedman rule, irrespective of the form of the utility function and due to
the presence of distortionary taxes, ceases to be optimal. This result is in line with the Phelps’s
criticism that Friedman’s first best argument ignores the second best fact that inflation produces
income for the government. I then prove that the optimality of the Friedman rule emerges if we
allow for two types of labor where one of them is subject to a cash-in-advance constraint and the
utility function is homothetic in these two types of labor and separable in consumption.
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